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Abstract 
In absence of traditional state regulation, corporations choose to self-regulate their 
behavior at times. Caring for the environment, initiating social projects, fighting modern 
slavery; the list of voluntary corporate initiatives is quite extensive. However, the 
motivation behind these commitments often remains obscure as can be seen in the case 
of the petroleum industry. Petroleum corporations extensively pollute the environment 
with their products and, at the same time, promise to contribute to its long-term protection. 
This research seeks to address the question why petroleum corporations decide to self-
regulate in the first place and how they select the commitments appropriate to their 
business. Based on the psychological concept of self-regulation, the case study of the 
research examines the self-regulatory behavior of the corporations involved in the gas 
pipeline project Nord Stream 2: the executing corporation Nord Stream 2 AG and the 
investing corporations Uniper, OMV, Wintershall, ENGIE, and Shell. The qualitative 
analysis supports the hypotheses that (1) corporate self-regulation occurs as a 
consequence of tension between external political interest and internal financial interest 
and (2) petroleum corporations self-regulate with a strong focus on the energy transition 
and environmental protection. The empirical findings align with the literature review in 
criticizing the lack of appropriate quantitative measurements and sanctions concerning 
non-compliance with voluntary commitments. The voluntary commitments remain 
fragile with the corporations having absolute authority over their own self-regulation 
governance and little incentive to improve their transparency. However, best self-
regulatory practice is being showcased by ENGIE’s commitment to the issuance of green 
bonds. By raising funds for environmentally sustainable projects through the green bonds 
market, ENGIE reacts to both external political pressure deriving from the energy 
transition and the corporate objective of profit maximization. The research concludes by 
pointing out that self-regulation in form of green bonds constitute an opportunity to both 
address the much-discussed credibility problem of the petroleum industry and serve a new 
and growing ESG market.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The initial research of this thesis revolved around one rather simple legal concept: 
incorporation. The attribution of legal personality to incorporated business entities 
constitutes an integral parts of today’s modern economy. The ability for a corporation to 
form a revenue stream and manage its resources separately from its shareholders is deeply 
ingrained in today’s understanding of international business (McBride, 2011: 2-5). 
Incorporation has become a constituting element to such an extent that it is difficult to 
imagine the international economy without multinational corporations with operations 
crossing national borders. As members of society, corporations are, at the same time, 
entitled to form a legally independent corporate entity and required to behave in a 
responsible manner (Wilmot, 2001). But what exactly constitutes responsible corporate 
conduct when a corporate entity operates in legislative environments with differing 
standards and in absence of binding multilateral regulation?  
 
The cross-border nature of multinational corporations and their operations 
obscures the attribution of state responsibility for their business conduct in unprecedented 
ways. Large corporations can accumulate a high level of market capitalization with their 
financial power exceeding the gross domestic product of entire states. Exemplarily, the 
market capitalization of Apple, currently approximated at $886.6 million (Nasdaq, 
2018a), surpasses the total economic performance of states like Norway, Saudi Arabia, 
and Argentina (World Bank, 2017). This financial power provides necessary resources to 
seek out the most favorable tax environments for the corporation’s revenues. In the 
absence of a sovereign ruler in the international political realm, rules and laws between 
states will differ in extent and content, possibly annulling each other or exposing 
legislative gaps. Whereas common citizens are primarily bound to declare their income 
in the location of their residency, multinational corporations will be able to employ tax 
9 
 
strategies favoring their own financial interests instead. The exploitation of these 
legislative loopholes was famously exposed in the practice of the double Irish (Darby III 
and Lemaster, 2007). Multinationals like Starbucks and Alphabet declared their profits in 
Ireland and the Netherlands, ultimately shifting revenue streams to low-tax environments 
and avoiding taxation in high-tax legislations within the European Union (EU). The 
practice was perfectly legal based on the taxation code of the individual EU member 
states. The public and EU member states missing out on taxation revenues, however, 
deemed the taxation strategy inappropriate and unethical (European Commission, 2016). 
 
The preferred method of regulating corporate behavior considered unethical is the 
implementation of command-and-control policies on a national basis and extending the 
approach in bilateral and multilateral agreements. But outside of this binding legal 
environment, multinational corporations might already choose to self-regulate their 
behavior by committing themselves to high standards of conduct and business ethics. At 
times, these individual standards of conduct exceed the legal requirements of the host 
state and can be counted towards corporate awareness for responsible behavior; at other 
times, the commitment remains a mere public relations statements. Exemplarily, 
Starbucks was one of the corporations which employed the double Irish taxation strategy 
while stating in its corporate standards of business conducts “community involvement” 
as one of its core business ethics (Starbucks, 2011: 23). Thus, the research arrived at its 
very topic: corporate self-regulation in the absence of government-mandated regulation 
and the low credibility of corporate commitments to responsible behavior. 
 
 
1.1 Puzzle of Self-regulation 
 
The first puzzle concerns the very nature of the commitments: Why do 
corporations voluntarily restrict their own business conduct in absence of binding state 
regulation? Economic research in the field of public choice suggests that political 
pressure in the immediate environment of a corporation will lead to self-regulative 
behavior (Williams, 2004; Moerel, 2012). Self-regulation is defined as the voluntary 
constraint of corporate behavior to preempt political action (OECD, 2002). One 
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prominent example is the current situation at the international corporation Facebook. 
Exposed data breaches in the social media network has put the corporation under intense 
pressure to reform its data privacy strategy. Although most governments across the world 
do not demand extensive levels of data protection and security, Facebook recently decided 
to apply the tough EU data privacy standards on a global scale (Politico, 2018). Voluntary 
commitments support the notion that corporations will have to find a balance between the 
economics of profit maximization inherent to for-profit organizations and the political 
environment affecting their operations since unanticipated government regulations and 
public pressure might leave a corporation's operations and profit sources vulnerable 
(Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000). High political tensions might then tilt the balance 
in favor of more extensive risk management of the political environment (Parker, 2002). 
 
The corporations seek to manage the political risk through different means with 
self-regulation being a rather public method. The voluntary constraints are intended to 
raise the costs of regulating entities to enter the market of regulation and, thus, lower the 
risk of further regulation (Flohr, 2014). In highly profitable and regulated markets, self-
regulating behavior will likely avoid high costs for the corporation and form an 
incentivized option from a public choice perspective (Public Utility Research Center, n/a; 
Camison-Zornoza and Boronat-Navarro, 2010). In addition, self-regulative behavior may 
be an advantageous strategy for the corporation to maintain its reputation and ethical 
standards (Grasmick and Appleton, 1977). In the example of Facebook, applying the 
highest possible data privacy standard globally might ease tension between regulator and 
regulating entity and protect the public reputation of the company which is already being 
negatively affected under the hashtag #deletefacebook (Fortune, 2018). 
 
The second puzzle addresses the long-term impact of similar corporate behavior: 
How can a self-regulative commitment be credible if self-regulation remains inherently 
non-binding and non-compliance can go widely unnoticed and unpunished? As the 
previous example of Starbucks has shown, the credibility problem is inherent to business 
codices: The corporations define their own standards of business conduct, alter, interpret, 
and possibly re-interpret their meaning and content, and decide to which extent it will be 
permissible to abide by or ignore them. In absence of an independent regulating entity, 
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the corporations take upon themselves the responsibility to regulate their own behavior 
and essentially become regulated and regulating entity at the same time. Academic 
research on anti-corruption measures suggests that transparent and clear monitoring 
processes with external reviews could aid the credibility of voluntary commitments 
(Giavazzi, Cottone, and De Rosa, 2014; Giavazzi, 2014), but more industry-specific 
measures are missing in the academic literature. 
 
 
1.2 Research Objectives 
 
The objective of this research will be to examine the activity of self-regulation in 
the petroleum industry and provide insight into possible solutions for the long-term 
viability of voluntary corporate commitments to environmental, social, and governance 
(ESG) standards. Within the topic self-regulation, the petroleum industry provides an 
interesting research example. The industry has been notoriously known for polluting the 
environment while providing essential energy resources to modern societies. The 
contradiction in corporate behavior and corporate aspirations of contributing to society 
have been contradicting, if not mutually exclusive. The research focus was further 
narrowed to focus on the gas pipeline project Nord Stream 2. The project which is 
currently still in the permitting process has been fiercely debated with the German 
government supporting and the Danish Senate blocking the project (Nord Stream 2, 
2018a; Folketinget, 2017). Examining the corporate behavior and self-regulation of the 
executing corporation Nord Stream 2 AG and the investing corporations Uniper SE, 
OMV AG, Wintershall Holding GmbH, ENGIE S.A., and Shell plc1 will add a new 
perspective to the political debate surrounding the project and provide more industry-
specific understanding of the theoretical and practical occurrence of self-regulation. The 
research will seek to answer the following research question and will anticipate a 
discussion based on the following two hypotheses: 
 
                                                          
1 Throughout the research, only the abbreviated form of the investing corporation’s names will be used to 
facilitate the reading flow (Uniper SE - Uniper, OMV AG - OMV, Wintershall Holding GmbH - 
Wintershall, ENGIE S.A. - ENGIE, Shell plc - Shell). Nord Stream 2 AG will be spelled out in full in order 
to differentiate between the project and the executing corporation more easily. 
12 
 
Why do corporations decide to self-regulate their corporate behavior in absence of 
binding state legislation, and how do corporations involved in the gas pipeline project 
Nord Stream 2 and headquartered in the European Union self-regulate? 
(1) Corporate self-regulation in form of standards and monitoring will be motivated 
by political opposition and hampered by financial pressure. 
(2) The examined downstream petroleum corporations will self-regulate with 
strong focus on the energy transition and environmental protection. 
 
The research will commence by outlining the theoretical framework of 
psychological self-regulation and providing a literature review of corporate social 
responsibility measures, reactionary commitments, and credibility issues associated with 
corporate self-regulation. The theoretical framework will give structure to the research 
and facilitate the understanding of the multifaceted nature of corporate self-regulation. 
The research will create a more holistic understanding of corporate self-regulation and 
emphasize its interdisciplinary nature throughout the subsequent empirical analysis and 
discussion of the case study. The case study will explore self-regulation in the context of 
Nord Stream 2 and discuss differences and similarities between the executing Nord 
Stream 2 AG and the investing corporations. The research will conclude with the 
examination of the specific political and economic interests shaping self-regulation in this 
specific case and a discussion of the relevance of international frameworks and green 
bonds for voluntary commitments in the petroleum industry. 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Since its acknowledgement as an academic discipline, psychological concepts 
have transcended their boundaries to appear in economic and political research. 
Behavioral psychology has been translated into concepts of economic behavior (Crusius, 
van Horen, and Mussweiler: 2012: 680), and ethics, a character trait formerly reserved to 
sentient beings, has entered the academic as well as public discussion regarding policy 
and regulation question (Norman, 2011). Daniel Kahneman even received the 2002 Nobel 
Prize in economics for “having integrated insights from psychological research into 
economic science” (Nobel Media, 2002). Kahneman (2003: 166) points out that 
psychological research can be especially valuable when guiding economic research 
without questioning the fundamental assumptions of the economic discipline. 
The theoretical framework builds on Kahneman’s interdisciplinary idea of 
psychology and economics by adapting the psychological theory of self-regulation 
(Baumeister and Vohs, 2007) to corporate behavior. The original psychological theory of 
self-regulation separates the factors shaping human self-regulation into four categories: 
standards, monitoring, willpower, and motivation. As a first step, the content of each 
category will be elaborated from its traditional perspective of psychology. Since the 
theoretical model has been exclusively used to explain human behavior, each category 
will be adapted to include the macro- and microeconomic theory of corporate self-
regulation as a second step. Thus, the research will be guided by the framework of 
psychological self-regulation but based on fundamental economic assumptions. The 
theoretical section will continue by discussing two of the most prominent forms of self-
regulation – corporate social responsibility and reactionary commitments – and conclude 
by addressing the main issue of credibility in voluntary self-regulation. 
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2.1 Psychological Theory of Self-regulation 
 
Self-regulation is a term commonly used to refer to “freedom, autonomy, agency, 
responsibility, maturity, ego-strength, willpower, self-control, choice, purposiveness, 
self-direction, voluntary action, self-intervention” in the discipline of psychology 
(Karoly, 1993). The concept describes the practice of voluntary restriction in human 
behavior (Carver and Scheier, 2016: 3), more colloquially known as “self-stopping” 
(Baumeister and Vohs, 2007: 4). The individual will monitor her behavior by comparing 
her behavior with a set of ideal standards. The ideal standards will vary depending on the 
individual’s personal preferences, her physical and emotional resources, and the 
perceived expectations in her immediate environment (Baumeister and Heatherton, 1996; 
Carver and Scheier, 1982). 
The concept of self-regulation has been employed to describe the economic 
phenomenon of corporations imposing voluntary restrictions upon their business 
activities. Within a traditional command-and-control regulatory environment, 
governmental entities impose restraints on corporate behavior through legislation 
(Maxwell, Lyon, and Hackett, 2000: 1). In absence of traditional regulation, corporations 
increasingly commit to voluntary codes of business conduct and corporate social 
responsibility (OECD, 2002: 73). Similar to self-regulation in human behavior, corporate 
self-intervention seeks to find the right balance between their inherent profit-maximizing 
behavior and the ideal standards set by their environment. In order to understand this 
specific type of self-regulation in-depth, the theoretical framework will continue by 
examining corporate self-regulation according to each category of the psychological 
model of self-regulation proposed by Baumeister and Vohs (2007): standards, 
monitoring, willpower, and motivation.  
 
 
2.1.1 Standards 
 
Standards constitute the ideal behavior individuals prefers for themselves. The act 
of self-regulation will seek to bring the individual’s actual behavior in line with these 
sought-after ideals (Baumeister and Vohs, 2007: 3). A system of standards with a serial 
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hierarchic fashion may enable the individual to respond to different standards at the same 
time by applying assembling criteria (Simon, 1967: 33-34). In the case of contradicting 
criteria and objectives, standards will need to be clear and well-defined to allow for the 
sequencing of standards (ibid.). 
 
In relation to corporate self-regulation, the corporate code of business conduct can 
be viewed as an individual set of ideal standards. At the minimum, the voluntary standards 
emphasize the corporation’s commitment to upholding national legislation in a particular 
policy area. Codes of business conduct are traditionally composed by the individual 
committing corporation, refer to internationally acknowledged frameworks and industry 
standards, and address a variety of issues (Haufler, 2001: 1). Social matters, like pledges 
to observe universal human rights and prevent race- and gender-related discrimination, 
are often addressed in voluntary commitments. Environmental issues for, by way of 
example, the prevention of extensive industrial pollution or protection of local animal 
populations are also commonly addressed. In addition to these main themes, corporations 
increasingly include commitments to anti-money laundering, taxation, and anti-
corruption measures in their statements. (OECD, 2001; OECD, 2011) 
 
The standards of business conduct of the U.S. American corporation Starbucks 
state that the corporation “is committed to complying with local laws, regulations, and 
codes and to working fairly and honestly with government officials” (Starbucks, 2011: 
12). This type of voluntary standard does not constitute self-regulative behavior since the 
commitment does not extend beyond national regulation and does not impose restrictions 
on the corporation’s operations. However, the standards stated in the code of business 
conduct exceed national legal requirements at times. Exemplarily, the German postal 
service Deutsche Post AG commits itself to using environmentally friendly technology 
and continuously reducing its corporate CO2 output (Deutsche Post AG, 2018). Although 
Germany’s environmental policy is comparatively comprehensive (Yale University, 
2018a), Deutsche Post AG takes its environmental standards one step further by 
voluntarily committing itself to more extensive environmental protection. These practical 
examples of corporate self-regulation illustrate that standards may vary greatly in extent, 
but always determine an ideal striven for. 
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2.1.2 Monitoring 
 
After specifying the level and content of self-committing standards, the 
individuals will theoretically self-monitor and reduce discrepancy between standards and 
actual behavior to their best ability (Karoly, 1993: 31-36). The component of monitoring 
ensures that the individuals become aware of their behavior deviating from the standards 
and ultimately adjust their behavior according to their requirements. In a traditional 
command-and-control environment, the state will install the appropriate monitoring 
processes for the standards enforced by law (Stigler, 1971). If a corporation decides to 
engage in self-regulation by setting its own standards, corporate resources will have to be 
dedicated to monitoring and adjusting deviating corporate behavior effectively. Thus, 
leaving regulation to the corporations will transfer the cost of monitoring from the 
regulating entity to the individual corporations (Haufler, 2001: 114). 
 
The transfer would be entirely beneficial to the regulating entity if the compliance 
capability would be given in each self-regulatory regime and at every time (O’Callaghan, 
2016: 71). The inherent problem with voluntary corporate standards is the fact that they 
remain non-binding. Aside from assuming their traditional role of the regulated entity, 
the corporations take on the responsibility of penalizing their own non-compliance as the 
regulating institution (Chance, 1978). Since it is not in the corporation’s interest to 
jeopardize its operations by publicly acknowledging non-compliance, the question 
remains if voluntary corporate commitments merely provide a veil for corporate 
misdemeanors. In the current information-rich societies, the activities of civil society can 
substitute for some of the traditional state-regulated monitoring by threatening to share 
non-compliant corporate behavior online and possibly damaging the corporate brand 
(Haufler, 2001: 109). However, such activities will not erase the necessity for effective 
internal monitoring in corporate self-regulation. 
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2.1.3 Willpower 
 
Whereas the factors standards and monitoring state how self-regulation will 
manifest itself, the category of willpower as well as the following category motivation 
showcase the reasons why an individual chooses to engage in or refrain from self-
regulation. Willpower refers to the self-regulatory strength of individuals, meaning their 
ability to self-regulate their behavior. The process of self-regulation requires energy 
depending on the extent of control exercised and might lead to ego depletion. Ego 
depletion refers to a condition in which the individuals has fewer resources at their 
disposal than usual. The condition will decrease available willpower to control behavior 
and to engage in self-regulation. (Baumeister and Vohs, 2007: 2-3) 
 
Based on the individualistic approach (Buchanan, 1949: 498; Downs, 1957), 
every individual, institution, and corporation holds private interests which it will pursue 
to maximize its own utility. Within human systems, the reduction in blood glucose 
following self-regulative activity has been equated to decreasing levels of willpower to 
pursue private interest through self-regulation in subsequent situations (Gailliot et al., 
2007). Adjusting the finding to corporate self-regulation, low financial liquidity would 
equate to low psychological energy. Since the main objective of for-profit organizations 
is the maximization of profit, dedicating willpower towards in self-regulation would only 
be rational if it contributed to this particular goal. The availability of financial resources 
would enable the corporate dedication to long-term objectives, as for example self-
regulation. 
 
In the case of high expected value from cooperation and low transaction and 
commitment costs (Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992), self-regulation traditionally creates 
financial benefits if it occurs under the umbrella of industry associations. Prominent 
examples include the International Organization for Standardization (2018) and the 
United States Energy Association (2017). Long-standing industry self-regulation 
commitments such as the “Marine Stewardship Council (...), the Sustainable Forestry 
Initiative, or the Fair Labor Association” (Williams, 2004: 11) have continued to be 
effective and respected in their policy fields despite financial pressure from the individual 
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corporation’s shareholders (Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, and Sasser, 2001). This form of self-
regulation serves the best interest of both the individual corporation and the industry. The 
corporation maximizes its utility by avoiding government regulation and operating in a 
flexible compliance setting shaped by practical industry knowledge, and the industry will 
benefit from an overall improved reputation and increased credibility (Baldwin and Cave, 
1999: 126-128). 
 
 
2.1.4 Motivation 
 
Within the theory of self-regulation, motivation refers to the stimulus to engage 
in a certain behavior (Baumeister and Vohs, 2007: 2-3). The stimulus depends on a desire 
to live up to specific standards (Baumeister, Schmeichel, and Vohs, 2007: 23). Depending 
on the characteristics of the engaging person, the extent of desire will vary, and the 
motivation will be expressed differently (Higgins and Spiegel, 2004). Certain 
circumstances might motivate an individual to choose an approach strategy by acting 
whereas the same circumstances would incentivize another individual to employ an 
avoidance strategy by steering clear of specific actions (Scholar and Higgins, 2008: 490-
493). The level of external and internal motivation will determine if individuals are 
inclined to self-regulate their behavior. In absence of either type of motivation, self-
regulation will not take place. 
 
In context of corporate self-regulation, the motivation to self-regulate will 
primarily derive from the threat of regulation in the political environment affecting the 
corporation’s operations. The process of motivation formation can be best described by 
assuming a game-theoretical marketplace for regulation (Stigler, 1971). Within the 
market, the regulating institution will ultimately provide and legitimize the supply of 
regulation while the corporations affected by the regulation determine the primary 
demand (Becker, 1983). After both regulated and regulating entity have independently 
selected and announced their preferred level of regulation on the first stage of the game, 
the second stage will revolve around the question if the players choose to enter the 
marketplace. If the level of demanded and voluntarily implemented regulation by the 
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corporations does not match the preferred level of regulation of the regulating entity, the 
institution will enter the market and raise the legal requirements to its preferred level. The 
threat of more extensive state regulation when the regulating entity enters the marketplace 
will incentivize corporations to regulate their behavior voluntarily (Maxwell, Lyon, and 
Hackett, 2000). Preemptive self-regulation will lower the utility of raising the level of 
regulation according to the preferences of the regulating entity by drastically increasing 
the cost-to-benefit ratio of legal implementation. Due to the reduced willingness of the 
regulating entity to enter the market, the threat of further binding legislation affecting the 
operations of the regulated entity might be avoided.  
Aside from the regulatory threat, the non-monetary incentives of reputation and 
first-mover advantage will incentivize corporate self-regulation (Williams, 2004: 12). Out 
of these three factors, corporate reputation has especially developed into an important 
asset in strategic long-term business considerations (Svendsen et al., 2001). In recent 
years, reputation has become a priced corporate asset with visible impacts on the 
corporate statement. Therefore, self-regulative commitments might be solely publicized 
to ensure the protection of a corporate reputation (Kolk and vanTuder, 2002). Responsible 
conduct has been increasingly relevant in maintaining and developing relationships with 
various kinds of stakeholders, ranging from employees and investors to customers and 
suppliers. A company known for its irresponsible social and environmental behavior 
might miss out on valuable business opportunities and forego the opportunity of the first-
mover advantage. 
 
 
2.2 Practical Corporate Self-regulation 
 
Corporate self-regulation was defined as the phenomenon of corporations 
exercising control over their own behavior to preempt political action from regulating 
entities (Baldwin and Cave, 1999: 125). The freedom to set an individual focus in their 
self-regulation has led corporations to use manifold descriptions, among others: code of 
conduct, corporate governance report, compliance guideline, corporate social 
responsibility report, and ethics code. In addition, there does not exist one agreed upon 
definition of socially appropriate corporate behavior (Armstrong and Green, 2013: 1926); 
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some philosophers even support the sentiment that corporations are not able of morally 
responsible behavior at all (Velasquez, 1983). In face of this variation, ambiguity 
regarding the extent and comparability of self-regulative commitments has been a 
common theme in academic research. But two common forms of self-regulative measures 
which will be discussed in the further review have been highly visible: corporate social 
responsibility and reactionary commitments. 
 
 
2.2.1 Corporate Social Responsibility 
 
One recent trend in corporate self-regulation has been the increasing public 
proliferation of environmental and social standards (Williams, 2004: 10). The standards 
often exceed the regulatory requirements, especially of less regulated legal environments 
in nation-states without sufficient institutional leverage and establishment. The corporate 
behavior of developing codes of conduct and publicly committing to them seems to 
contradict the objective of maximizing profits inherent to multinationals (OECD, 2001). 
Armstrong and Green show that voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
initiatives can be an important part of increasing welfare in unregulated markets, but 
financial incentives like an opportunity to enhance the intangible asset of reputation or 
marketing socially responsibly sourced products, would be required due to the profit-
driven nature of corporations (Ellen, Mohr, and Webb, 2000). One might criticize that the 
corporate effort to self-regulate might not be genuine when the voluntary commitments 
are merely used to improve the corporate image. However, an action motivated by self-
interest does not make the action in itself ineffective or unacceptable; following Smith 
(1776, 2008: 25) “it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, 
that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest”. The assumption 
of self-interest does not imply a lower level of morality (Flohr, 2014: 204). Private 
incentive should even be one of the main factors researchers and policymakers should 
focus on in explaining and regulating self-regulation (Williams, 2004: 14). 
 
Exemplarily, Kolk and van Tulder (2002) examined the nature of self-regulatory 
codes regarding child labor in multinational textile corporations. Their findings suggest 
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that monitoring codes of conduct throughout a textile supply chain can be virtually 
impossible because international supply chains have become highly fragmented and non-
transparent. However, the threat of reputational damage creates a strong incentive to 
address misbehavior despite the high costs associated with the implementation of 
appropriate monitoring and sanctions systems. Accordingly, increased awareness of 
intangible issues as for instance human rights, sustainability, and diversity within civil 
society and the government will create the necessary self-interested financial incentives 
for corporations to commit to self-regulative measures in context of corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
 
2.2.2 Reactionary Commitments 
 
Regarding the origin of self-regulation, there has been increasing evidence for the 
hypothesis that companies implement corporate social responsibility measures to offset 
previous corporate social irresponsibility and avoid associated public scrutiny (Kotchen 
and Moon, 2011). Referring to the example of the textile sector, the 2013 Savar building 
collapse with a death toll of over 1,100 garment workers gave rise to fierce opposition 
from labor rights groups which demanded the improvement of workers’ safety. Since the 
catastrophe, more than 220 textile corporations have signed the Accord on Fire and 
Building Safety in Bangladesh which seeks to improve transparency and accountability 
in the textile industry and prevent similarly fatal events (Financial Times, 2018). 
Similarly, following the arrest of two Afro-American men at one of its stores, Starbucks 
reacted to the intense public outcry by announcing a nationwide racial-bias education 
training for all its employees (Starbucks, 2018).  
 
This type of reactionary corporate behavior which may arise in practical self-
regulation supports the discussed theoretical framework. The pressure within the 
immediate political environment of the corporation needs to be comparatively high and 
specific to incentivize corporate self-regulation. The example of Starbucks reaction to the 
outcry on social media shows that self-regulative action will occur if the political pressure 
focuses on one specific policy area. At the same time, the textile manufacturers’ demand 
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for more extensive government regulation of this specific policy area indicates that the 
corporations view safety as a business-crucial issue which they seek to address with the 
means of self-regulation (Financial Times, 2018). But their hesitation to fully commit to 
it suggests that collective action problems and related equity issues exist within the 
industry which cannot be overcome through self-regulative measures. The private 
sector’s interest to contribute to the universal ratification of self-regulative frameworks 
such as the United Nations (UN) Convention against Corruption is hampered by the 
highly competitive markets in developing countries with less strictly enforced legislation 
(Vlassis, 2014: 280). Can voluntary corporate self-regulative commitments therefore ever 
provide a credible addition to traditional command-and-control legislation if the 
commitments will only be reactionary by nature? 
 
 
2.3 Credibility Issues 
 
Generally, the practice of corporate self-regulation does not enjoy the best 
standing in the society. The publicized self-regulatory commitments are inherently non-
binding since the corporations assume the role of both regulated and regulating entity. 
This leads to a deep conflict in interest when non-compliance occurs, since the rules can 
be easily bent and standards changed according to the corporation’s current needs 
(Chance, 1978). Some researchers argue that voluntary corporate commitments merely 
provide a veil to hide corporate misdemeanors and whitewash the corporate image based 
on hollow promises. This might not come as a surprise when corporations only decide to 
commit to self-regulation under intense political pressure and when most of their 
corporate credibility has already been lost (cf. Politico, 2018). At the same time, national 
administration “ha(s) little capacity of developing a ‘big picture’ view of a (multinational 
corporation’s) global value chain” (OECD, 2013: 22-23) which leads to further 
transparency issues and a low level of perceived genuine credibility. Since private power 
“may be legitimately held only for the purpose of furthering the public good” (Parkinson, 
1995: 30-31), self-regulation should contribute to an improved economic outcome for it 
to be a respected practice. 
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Academic literature which openly critiques self-regulative commitments of 
corporations is abundant. Parker (2002: 26-27) underlines that standards of ethical 
corporate behavior cannot replace legalistic compliance commitments. She presents 
further evidence that non-binding, voluntary commitments promise great deeds and 
merely lead to whitewashing of the corporate image instead of the corporation achieving 
the promised targets (Cleek and Leonard, 1998). The elaboration of the chosen standards 
too often only scratches the surface of the addressed issues without committing to 
quantifiable measurements or issuing a strategy how to ensure the standards in the long-
term and under financial pressure. Substantive principles and values are often not well-
integrated in system-oriented compliance programs, thereby ignoring the fundamental 
core of the voluntary commitments. 
 
Williams (2004: 15-16) also points out that self-regulative commitments are 
inherently fragile and tend to failure. Since the benefits of self-regulation usually concern 
collective goods, the self-regulating corporation must deal with the problem of free-riding 
and the effort of only one corporation is hardly sufficient to achieve the protection of 
collective goods. The players will only stay committed to the long-term goal of self-
regulation if the commitments hold more individual utility than abandoning them (Tesler, 
1980: 27-28). Intangible incentives, such as reputation, legal and regulatory risk, and first-
mover advantage (Williams, 2004: 12-13), are difficult to quantify in contrast to tangible 
assets in form of sales and profit and their benefits might not be sufficiently clear to justify 
the corporate adherence to a voluntary self-regulative commitment. All doubts of 
whitewashing aside, if it can be assumed that a corporation is willing to commit to certain 
voluntary standards, how does its management ensure credibility and long-term 
commitment? 
 
Recurrent themes concerning the improvement of credibility in self-regulative 
commitments are transparency and independent monitoring. Self-regulation is an activity 
which seeks to inform the public about specific corporate commitments. This approach 
should ideally stand in contrast to the activity of lobbying which seeks to avoid public 
scrutiny. Any credible self-regulatory activity should be characterized by the opposite: 
open communication with the public and an honest approach with the highest possible 
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degree of transparency (Flohr, 2014: 204-206). Transparency is fundamental in delivering 
the best economic outcomes in the policy-making process. As asymmetrical distribution 
of information distorts the free market, inefficient outcomes in non-transparent markets 
are likely to be observed (Downs, 1957). In the corporate world, transparency has its 
origin in the boardroom where individual self-interest and group pressure might come in 
the way of best practice, as could be observed in the case of the Enron bankruptcy 
(Zandstra, 2002: 19). Without independent monitoring and delegated accountability, 
corrupt practices flourished and the corporation formerly posing as “the world’s greatest 
corporation” (ibid.) had to file for bankruptcy. In context of self-regulation, transparency 
will be the key to a credible and viable commitment. Only when provided with 
quantifiable objectives and metrics which, at best, will be monitored by an independent 
entity, and address the collective action problem within the relevant industry can self-
regulative commitments contribute to a successful regulation environment (Williams, 
2004). 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
 
Based on the interdisciplinary theoretical framework, the research will seek to 
analyze self-regulation in the practical environment of the petroleum industry. As 
mentioned in the introduction, the analysis will specifically examine the corporate 
behavior in downstream gas corporations headquartered in the EU in the context of the 
gas pipeline project Nord Stream 2. The methodology section will outline the reasons 
behind selecting this specific case and map out the chosen indicators according to the 
categories of the model of self-regulation (Baumeister and Vohs, 2007). 
 
3.1 Case Selection 
 
A group of corporations which has been heavily criticized for its unethical 
behavior and its non-compliance with voluntary self-regulative commitments is the 
petroleum industry. The petroleum industry has always had a divided attitude towards 
self-regulation. On one hand, most of petroleum corporations have committed to 
environmental protection and the energy transition from traditional to renewable sources 
to some extent. Petroleum corporations play a central role in modern societies by 
supporting virtually all functions of modern life with traditional energy resources. The 
corporations’ business activities secure the main energy supply in many world economies, 
making their operations political by nature (Foreign Affairs, 2015). 
On the other hand, the industry has been notoriously known for its extensive 
pollution of flora and fauna and disregard for long-term effects on human settlements in 
the proximity of its extraction and pipeline projects. Examples of self-regulative 
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commitments and contrasting corporate behavior abound: In 2003, energy corporation 
BP adopted the slogan “Beyond Petroleum:”, only to close its solar energy unit 
completely nine years later (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2018) and re-adopt a “fresh 
commitment to low carbon” in 2018 (The Economist, 2018). Similarly, the Norwegian 
energy corporation Statoil stated its intent to change its name to Equinor in a corporate 
move away from traditional energy resources to renewable energy (Statoil, 2018a). The 
corporate move is being supported by the Norwegian State, Statoil’s main shareholder 
with 67 percent (Statoil, 2018b: 8), which attributes greater credibility to the new 
corporate approach to diverge from selling the enormously profitable petroleum resources 
of Norway. In stark contrast, the Dutch energy corporation Shell has become infamous 
for its unethical corporate behavior in Nigeria which led to the involvement of the United 
Nations (UNEP, 2011). The question if corporate self-regulation in the petroleum 
industry merely constitutes an opportunity to whitewash polluting business operation 
becomes pressing when comparing Shell’s corporate claims to commit to environmental 
protection and sustainability with this corporate behavior (Shell, 2018a). 
Petroleum sourcing and transportation projects are characterized by high 
economic returns and high risk of default. The intense financial pressure was experienced 
by the entire industry especially in 2016 and early 2017 when low trading prices for oil 
and gas translated into serious economic impediments for petroleum operations (Nasdaq, 
2108b; cf. appendices 1-6: ‘willpower’). This obvious tension between economic pressure 
in their operations and the conflicting nature of their self-regulative commitments in the 
cross-border political environments make petroleum corporations a suitable object for 
analyzing and understanding corporate self-regulation more in-depth.  
The petroleum market is divided into three sectors: upstream corporations dealing 
with the exploration and drilling of crude oil and natural gas, midstream corporations 
handling the transportation of the petroleum products, and downstream corporations 
processing, purifying, distributing, and marketing the final products (Labmate Online, 
2018). Upstream corporations operate widely outside of the public eye and publish little 
information on their homepages. Their corporate behavior supports the hypothesis that 
corporations only self-regulate and publish information motivated by extensive external 
political pressure, but, at the same time, analyzing the absence of their behavior would 
create the problem of induction within academic research. The abundance of information 
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published by mid- and downstream petroleum corporations and their closer relationship 
society through the daily public energy supply make the focus on this part of the industry 
more feasible. 
The trend of self-regulation has spread globally, but “there are significant intra-
regional variations in practice” and commitments diverge to the point where the question 
arises “what exactly constitutes appropriate (corporate) behavior” in a specific industry 
(OECD, 2001: 3). Since international petroleum corporations are “registered and operate 
in more than one country (... with) subsidiaries report(ing) to the corporation’s central 
headquarters” (Encyclopædia Britannica, 2018b), the selection of an appropriate 
geographical focus will prove essential in collecting coherent data. The geographical area 
is chosen to encompass the EU in which member states, to varying extent, surrender parts 
of their sovereign decision-making power to the institution.2 The differences between the 
political environments of the individual member states will be suitable to show the 
influence of political interests on corporate self-regulation, but the context of the EU will 
provide a coherent research framework. 
In the context of mid- and downstream petroleum operations in the EU, the gas 
pipeline project Nord Stream 2 is currently one of the most politically contentious 
petroleum projects. The project will be executed by Nord Stream 2 AG headquartered in 
Switzerland with Russian energy corporations Gazprom as the sole shareholder and 
financed with investments from the multinational energy corporations Uniper, OMV, 
Wintershall, ENGIE, and Shell headquartered in EU member states (cf. appendix 1). 
Since the gas pipelines will cross through the exclusive economic zones (EEZ) of Russia, 
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany, the project has been at the center of EU-wide 
discussion (cf. Deutsche Welle 2017; Reuters, 2018a). The political tension and 
increasing financial pressure concerning the gas pipelines will provide a relevant and 
interesting case study to understand corporate self-regulation in mid- and downstream gas 
corporations in more detail, and the research findings will hopefully add a new facet to 
the critical discussion of the project. 
                                                          
2 The author is aware of the academic discussion if the EU constitutes a supranational or international 
organization. The organization exhibits both characteristics in relation to the policy area of energy. The 
question will not be addressed further in the research. 
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3.2 Research Objective 
 
The objective of this research will be to provide a holistic understanding of 
corporate self-regulation in the EU petroleum industry within the context of Nord Stream 
2. The research question guiding the research reads as follows: 
 
Why do corporations decide to self-regulate their corporate behavior in absence of 
binding state legislation, and how do corporations involved in the gas pipeline project 
Nord Stream 2 and headquartered in the European Union self-regulate? 
 
The analysis will be conducted within the discussed theoretical framework and 
focus on reputation in corporate social responsibility and reactionary commitments in the 
wider discussion. Based on the theoretical framework, political interests and economic 
objectives will be regarded as the independent variables which affect corporate self-
regulating behavior as the dependent variable. The public choice perspective of the 
research will assume perfect rationality within players and utility maximization in an 
environment characterized by political and economic tension as the corporations’ 
objective. The empirical case will be guided by two hypotheses which are postulated 
based on the discussed theoretical framework: 
 
(1) Corporate self-regulation in form of standards and monitoring will be motivated 
by political opposition and hampered by financial pressure. 
(2) The examined downstream petroleum corporations will self-regulate with 
strong focus on the energy transition and environmental protection. 
 
Since the discussed issues of reputation, regulatory risk, corporate social 
responsibility, and reactionary corporate behavior are inherently intangible and difficult 
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to quantify, the research will be conducted in a qualitative manner and in the awareness 
of the possible inaccuracy in anticipating the economic costs of these issues. 
 
3.3 Research Model 
 
The research methodology will be based on the discussed model of self-regulation 
proposed by Baumeister and Vohs (2007). The model analyzes self-regulation based on 
psychological processes and divides them into four categories: standards, monitoring, 
willpower, and motivation. The theoretical framework illustrated the adaption of the 
model from human behavior to corporate behavior with help of macro- and 
microeconomic theories of self-regulation. The research will collect information for each 
category of self-regulation from the corporations’ main public statements (corporate code 
of conduct, annual reports, and sustainability reports) and elaborate it in profiles for each 
corporation (cf. appendices 1-6). The qualitative analysis will draw on the collected 
information and display the relevant data appropriately. In general, the data research will 
follow the categories of self-regulation in the following manner: 
 
3.3.1 Standards 
 
Standards constitute one of two parts of the dependent variable of self-regulation and 
indicate the preferred behavior an individual seeks to achieve within the self-regulatory 
act. In context of corporate self-regulation, the preferred standards will be visible in the 
corporation’s public self-regulation commitments. The following policy areas are 
predominantly discussed in academic literature regarding corporate self-regulation and 
will be in the focus of this research: 
- environment and sustainability, 
- human rights and labor rights, 
- finances and taxation, 
- workplace safety, 
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- anti-corruption and anti-bribery, and 
- diversity. 
To assess the extent of the self-regulatory commitment, the varying degree will be 
categorized as the corporation not mentioning the specific policy area, adherence 
according to national law, and adherence according to international standards. The 
commitments will be generally evaluated for being formulated broadly, indicating weak 
commitment, or specifically, indicating strong commitment. 
 
3.3.2 Monitoring 
 
Monitoring constitutes the second part of the dependent variable of self-regulation. 
Monitoring processes ensure the individual’s mid- to long-term commitment to selected 
self-regulation. At corporations, the extent of monitoring procedures will be indicated by 
- the internal position assigned monitoring responsibility, and 
- the type and frequency of external publications on voluntary commitments. 
With increasing importance in hierarchy (not assigned, internal/external audit, legal 
department, compliance officer/ethics committee, CEO/CFO/COO, or board of 
directors3), the long-term commitments will be deemed to be enforced more thoroughly. 
 
 
3.3.3 Willpower 
 
The individual’s extent of willpower to correct mismatches between actual and 
expected behavior will determine if individuals ultimately control internal urges and self-
regulate their behavior. In the case of corporations, the willpower will be characterized 
by the intensity of financial pressure on corporate operations and non-monetary interests 
                                                          
3 Inspired by the methodology in Giavazzi (2014). 
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within the shareholder group. Therefore, the components to be examined and to establish 
the independent variable of willpower in the individual corporations will be: 
- revenue and profit for the most recently concluded calendar year (2017), and 
- the corporation’s main shareholders and their objectives. 
 
 
3.3.4 Motivation 
 
The category of motivation in individuals refers to the stimulus which incentivizes 
humans to self-regulate their behavior. In the context of corporate behavior, the 
motivation to self-regulate derives from the political environment and expected threats 
from the regulating entity. The empirical analysis will examine the independent variable 
within the political environment of the EU member states whose EEZ will be affected by 
the Nord Stream 2 project by collecting the following data: 
- the geographical location of Nord Stream 2 operations and the investing 
corporations’ headquarters, 
- the country’s percentage contribution to the EU gross domestic product (GDP) 
establishing relational national economic power, 
- the country’s energy import dependence in general and specifically gas 
establishing economic interest in the Nord Stream 2 project, and 
- the country’s environmental performance index indicating national commitment 
to fighting climate change. 
 
3.4 Limitations 
 
The reader should be aware of certain limitations which will apply to this research: 
Anthropomorphism 
Attributing human traits, emotions, and intentions to business entities can be difficult in 
the sense that corporate behavior is not equated to human behavior in some schools of 
thought of moral philosophy. However, from the perspective of law, corporations are 
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equated to humans as legally independent, responsible, and liable. Like human beings, 
corporations will seek to maximize their economic utility. Although corporations are 
social communities, corporate motives are largely independent from individual motives 
and emotions through the separation of management and ownership. Thus, the examined 
corporations will be assessed as independent individuals affected by their circumstances 
as much as human individuals according to Wilmot (2001). 
Partly exclusion of political environment of investing corporations 
All investing corporations are headquartered in the EU, and most of them concentrate on 
the EU market for their downstream activities. Analyzing each individual political 
environment that the investing corporations operate in would not be in the interest of the 
research. The empirical analysis will instead focus on collecting information about the 
member states affected by the Nord Stream 2 project and supply additional information 
if one of the countries with corporate headquarters are specifically involved. 
External communication 
Although self-regulation occurs in both external and internal corporate behavior, the 
analysis will focus exclusively on the external communication of the examined 
corporations. As stated above, public information on the downstream energy sector is 
widely available and accessible, providing an adequate analytical foundation. The 
analysis will deliberately exclude any lobbying efforts of the individual corporations from 
the analysis. Although lobbying constitutes a part of the active engagement between 
corporations and their respective legislative environments, the activity not be deemed a 
part of corporate self-regulation. 
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4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
The empirical analysis will examine corporate self-regulation in the executing and 
investing corporations of the Nord Stream 2 project. First, the current situation of the 
Nord Stream 2 project will be outlined. Secondly, the analysis will examine the proposed 
variables according to the psychological model of self-regulation (Baumeister and Vohs, 
2007). The dependent self-regulation variables of standards and monitoring will be based 
on qualitative findings in the public behavior of the examined corporations, and the 
independent variables of motivation and willpower will be based on information from the 
corporations’ political and the economic environment, respectively. The empirical 
insights will be structured by contrasting the executing Nord Stream 2 AG with the 
investing corporations Uniper, OMV, Wintershall, ENGIE, and Shell. The objective will 
be to provide extensive qualitative data on self-regulation of all involved corporations to, 
subsequently, enable a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical and practical nature 
of self-regulation within the petroleum sector generally and within Nord Stream 2 
particularly. 
 
4.1 Nord Stream 2 
 
The Nord Stream 2 projects entails the construction and operation of two offshore 
pipelines which will transport natural gas through the seabed of the Baltic Sea from the 
St. Petersburg Region in Russia to Lubmin on the Northeast coastline of Germany. The 
pipeline will be approximately 1,200 kilometers long and able to transport a yearly 
maximum capacity of 27.5 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas per pipeline (Nord 
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Stream 2, 2017a). The project management argues that the imported gas will compensate 
for falling gas production in the EU and facilitate connection to Russia’s gas reserves in 
the future (OECD/IEA, 2018). The gas pipelines will be installed on a similar Baltic Sea 
route as the active Nord Stream twin pipelines crossing the national territory of Russia, 
Finland, Sweden, Denmark, and Germany. The Nord Stream pipelines carry a combined 
amount of 55 bcm of natural gas a year from Russia to EU territory, the same gas supply 
anticipated for the Nord Stream 2 pipelines. The Nord Stream project was implemented 
by the corporation Nord Stream AG, the predecessor to the Nord Stream 2 AG operating 
the current project, and the pipelines have been in operation since 2011 and 2012, 
respectively. If construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipelines commences in 2018 as 
planned, the gas transmission from Russia to the EU through the Baltic Sea will be 
doubled by the end of 2019. (Nord Stream 2, 2017a). 
 
Picture 1: Proposed Nord Stream 2 pipeline route (green) 
alongside Nord Stream pipeline route (blue), 
Source: Nord Stream 2 (2017b: 7). 
 
 
The main difference between the two projects lies in their respective ownership 
structure. Gazprom owns 51 percent of the Nord Stream project, Wintershall and PEGI 
15.5 percent, respectively, and ENGIE and N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie nine percent, 
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respectively (Nord Stream, 2018). The current Nord Stream 2 project is completely 
owned by Gazprom as the sole shareholder of the Nord Stream 2 AG which is responsible 
for construction and operation of the pipelines. The corporations Uniper, OMV, 
Wintershall, ENGIE, and Shell do not hold any shares in the business endeavor. Instead, 
the five European corporations signed a financing memorandum with Gazprom. Each 
corporation will contribute ten percent of the predicted construction costs to the project 
(ENGIE, 2017a; OMV Aktiengesellschaft, 2018a; Shell, 2017a; Uniper SE, 2017a; 
Wintershall, 2017a). In the beginning of 2018, the total costs were anticipated to amount 
to a total of €9.5 billion. Thus, each corporation’s commitment will add up to €950 million 
with a mix of 30 percent owner’s equity and 70 percent bank loans with corporate 
underwriting until the end of the anticipated construction phase in 2019 (Gazprom, 2017). 
The political discussion surrounding the Nord Stream 2 project has been controversial 
at best and passively hostile at worst with Russia and Germany supporting and Denmark 
and the European Commission opposing the construction. At the same time, the financial 
uncertainty associated with the project has set the investing corporations’ teeth on edge. 
With the theoretical discussion of self-regulation in mind, the empirical analysis will 
examine the self-regulative behavior of the executing Nord Stream 2 AG and the investing 
corporations in this tense political and economic environment. The empirical findings 
will be contrasted between the executing Nord Stream 2 AG and the investing 
corporations Uniper, OMV, Wintershall, ENGIE, and Shell within each category 
elaborated in the psychological model of self-regulation: standards, monitoring, 
willpower, and motivation. The elaborations will place emphasis on the findings related 
to Nord Stream 2 AG and select appropriate examples from the investing corporations to 
showcase similarities and differences. 
 
 
4.2 Standards 
 
The selected corporations were examined for their commitment to self-regulation in 
respect to environment and sustainability, human rights and labor rights, finances and 
taxation, workplace safety, anti-corruption and anti-bribery, and diversity (table 1). 
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Although both Nord Stream 2 AG and the investing corporations rely on international 
frameworks for guidance, the most striking difference is the extent and specificity of 
addressed policy area. 
 
Table 1: Self-regulation standards in examined corporations, 
Source: Author’s own elaborations based on corporate profiles (cf. appendices 1-6: ‘Standards’). 
 
Environment / 
Sustainability 
Human rights / Labor 
rights 
Finances / Taxation 
Nord Stream 2 Espoo convention not mentioned not mentioned 
Uniper 
German CSR Directive 
Implementation Act, 
German Commercial Code, 
SDG, World Bank Zero 
Flaring Initiative 
Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights 
national law 
OMV 
Austrian law, Paris 
Agreement, CDP Climate 
Change, SDG 
UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights, 
UK Modern Slavery Act 
national law 
Wintershall 
Paris Agreement, World 
Bank Zero Flaring 
Initiative 
Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, ILO’s core 
labor standards 
not mentioned 
ENGIE 
Paris Agreement, SDG, 
Green Bonds market 
UN Global Compact, French 
Transparency International, 
Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative 
not mentioned 
Shell 
Paris Agreement, World 
Bank Zero Flaring 
Initiative, SDG 
Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, ILO 
conventions, UN Guiding 
Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, collaboration 
with Danish Institute for 
Human Rights 
national law, 
collaboration with NGO 
'The B Team' 
 
  
37 
 
Table 1 continued. 
 Workplace safety 
Anti-corruption / 
Anti-bribery 
Diversity 
Nord Stream 2 
international H&S 
standards 
not mentioned not mentioned 
Uniper 
international H&S 
standards 
SDG, internal standards 
SDG, German law, 
Corporate Diversity 
Charter Germany 
OMV 
international H&S 
standards 
OECD Anti-bribery 
Convention, UK Bribery Act 
internal standards 
Wintershall 
international H&S 
standards 
international standards internal BASF standards 
ENGIE 
international H&S 
standards 
international standards, ISO 
37001 Anti-Bribery 
Management Systems 
internal standards 
Shell 
international H&S 
standards 
UN Global Compact, OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises 
internal standards 
 
 
4.2.1 Environment 
 
Nord Stream 2 AG emphasizes legal compliance and environmental issues in all 
its public statements (Nord Stream 2, 2018b). Exemplarily, the corporate management 
developed a specific conservation strategy for the Russian Kurgalsky nature reserve “in 
line with international best practice” and in cooperation with environmental experts and 
NGO (Nord Stream 2, 2018c). Environmental studies of the region have concluded that 
the pipelines will not affect the biodiversity of the region, but the corporation will seek to 
develop an action plan which will “enable (the corporation) to meet its obligations to 
international environmental standards compliance”. (Nord Stream 2, 2018b) 
Nord Stream 2 AG also underlines its commitment to the Espoo process which 
regulates the environmental impact assessment in cross-border projects (United Nations, 
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2018a). The Espoo convention was signed by Germany, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland 
in 1995 (ibid.). The accurate preparation of the environmental assessment according to 
these international standards holds much value in the consultation phase before the actual 
construction and operation phase. Nord Stream 2 AG’s continuous employment of 
Ramboll Finland to mitigate further environmental issues like underwater noise illustrates 
the corporation’s willingness to self-regulate its environmental impact according to the 
specific inter-country requirements (Nord Stream 2, 2018d). 
Support for local environmental projects is also common among the investing 
corporations with, as an example, Shell (2018a: 48) supporting bird surveys in Oman. But 
more generally, the investing corporations draw on international frameworks to guide 
their self-regulation regarding their impact on the environment as well (cf. appendices 2-
6). The United Nation (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) concerning the 
objectives of affordable and clean energy and climate action are cited by four out of the 
five investing corporations, and another widely referenced UN initiatives is the COP 21 
Paris Agreement of 2015 regarding the global reduction of CO2-emissions (cf. table 1). 
OMV, Wintershall, and Shell are also engaged in the World bank initiative “Zero routine 
flaring by 2030”, but the list of projects, indices, and commitments aimed at 
environmental and climate action is comparatively extensive (cf. appendices 2-6: 
‘Environment / Sustainability’). The issues indicate a high willingness to self-regulate at 
first sight, but when examining the commitments in-depth, they remain at the surface of 
the issues and only become more specific in two of the investing corporations. 
The only issue thoroughly addressed in all external communication of the 
investing corporations is their commitment to the global energy transition (ibid.). Most 
of corporate communication which could be deemed self-regulation revolves around the 
issue of reducing CO2-emission and investing in renewable energy projects. The 
incentive behind focusing on this topic is clearly communicated by the individual 
corporations: The reputational risk inherent to operating in the petroleum industry and the 
possibility of tarnishing the corporate brand with irresponsible behavior would affect all 
corporate relationships from new investments and public relations to work force and 
business-to-business activities. OMV clearly states its objectives of supporting the energy 
transition as a business opportunity to “(1) gain access to new resources, (2) create a win-
win situation for society, the environment and the Company, (3) secure social acceptance 
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of the business operations, (4) attract best employees, contractors, and investors” (OMV 
Aktiengesellschaft, 2017a: 3). ENGIE similarly cuts right to the chase of the matter with 
its corporate social responsibility objective “(…) to secure (the corporation’s) role as a 
leading stakeholder of the energy transition and associated services beyond energy” 
(ENGIE, 2017a). The reputational risk associated with the investment in traditional 
petroleum projects has already incentivized Uniper to refrain from investing in new coal-
fired power plants and phasing out their current coal investments (Uniper, SE 2018: 102-
103). 
 
4.2.2 Other Categories 
 
Aside from the environmental self-regulation commitments, most other policy 
areas such as diversity, human rights, taxation, and anti-corruption, are not directly 
addressed in the official communication of Nord Stream 2 AG (cf. appendix 1). This fact 
does not imply that the management does not care about these issues. However, the 
absence of publicized self-regulation commitment in those areas indicates that they are 
not deemed relevant to corporate operations at this point. The official communication of 
Nord Stream 2 touches on one other issue: work safety. During the construction and 
operation phases of the pipelines, “the highest international safety standards” (Nord 
Stream 2, 2018b) will be employed in order to ensure “safe and reliable” procedures. The 
commitment to the non-binding, international Health, Safety, and Environment standards 
can be viewed as a self-regulative measure on behalf of labor safety and was already in 
place during the construction of the previous Nord Stream pipeline. The investing 
corporations show similar intention to improve workplace safety at their petroleum 
sourcing and transportation sights (cf. appendices 2-6: ‘Workplace safety’). The 
prevention of death and injury cases remains an important issue as reputational risk can 
only be managed holistically when applied in all operations, and industrial standards and 
sharing best practice has become the norm (Shell Global, n/a). 
Since reputation is an intangible asset, intangible issues in form of human rights, 
ethics grey zones, and the risk of corrupt behavior in the workforce are addressed in the 
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corporate self-regulation statements as well (cf. appendices 2-6: ‘Standards’). The 
investing corporations refer to international frameworks, as, for instance, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights or ILO conventions. The fact that the mitigation of financial 
risks remains at the center of the investing corporation’s strategy (Shell Global, 2018a) 
becomes evident when examining corporate self-regulation in the policy areas of taxation 
(cf. appendices 2-6: ‘Taxation’) and diversity (ibid.: ‘Diversity’). The standards in the 
two intangible policy areas often remain weakly defined and will be usually implemented 
in accordance with country-specific law or internal standards without clear methods. 
Exemplarily, only Uniper refers to a specific diversity charter whereas the other four 
investing corporations remain unclear on how their self-imposed diversity objectives will 
be ultimately achieved (ibid.). The same holds true for the taxation strategy of the 
investing corporations with two of them refraining from mentioning their taxation 
strategies at and the other three corporations stating that they will comply with appropriate 
national taxation laws (cf. table 1).  
 
4.3 Monitoring 
 
The analysis of the corporation’s monitoring standards uncovered two main findings: 
the corporations’ use of international frameworks to guide the content of their non-
mandatory standards and the widespread absence of clear measurements and sanctions 
concerning non-compliance with voluntary commitments. 
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Table 2: Monitoring in examined corporations, 
Source: Author’s own elaborations based on corporate profiles (cf. appendices 1-6: ‘Monitoring’) 
 
Internal 
responsibility 
Method 
Publication 
Type of report Frequency 
Nord Stream 2 
not publicly 
assigned 
Internal best 
practice from 
Nord Stream AG 
- - 
Uniper 
Supervisory 
Board, Executive 
Board, Chief 
Sustainability 
Officer 
GRI Standards, 
German 
Commercial law, 
internal review 
annual financial 
report, 
sustainability 
report 
biannually 
OMV 
Supervisory 
Board, Executive 
Board, Chief 
Compliance 
Officer 
GRI Standards, 
Austrian Code of 
corporate 
governance, 
internal and 
external review 
annual financial 
report, 
sustainability 
report' 
annually 
Wintershall 
Executive Board, 
Chief Compliance 
Officer 
internal review 
sustainability 
report 
annually 
ENGIE 
Board of 
Directors, Chief 
Executive Officer, 
Green Bond 
Committee 
GRI Standards, 
internal and 
external review 
(specific focus on 
SRI) 
Integrated 
financial and 
sustainability 
report, corporate 
social 
responsibility 
policy 
annually 
Shell 
Board of 
Directors, 
Executive Board, 
Corporate and 
Social 
Responsibility 
committee 
GRI Standards, 
internal review 
(Report Review 
Panel) 
sustainability 
report 
annually 
 
 
4.3.1 International Frameworks 
 
International frameworks are referred to in context of the official disclosure of 
non-mandatory corporate information at all examined corporations (cf. appendices 1-6: 
‘Standards’)). Nord Stream 2 AG prepared its environmental analysis according to the 
multilateral Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) framework and received an award 
from the Finnish Association for Impact Assessment for its environmental report (Nord 
Stream 2, 2018d). The transparent handling of the process can be attributed to the 
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Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, also known as The Aarhus Convention 
(European Commission, 2017a). The European Commission signed this convention into 
law to facilitate public access to information about environmental projects. Since nature 
constitutes a collective good to society, the procedure ensures that the effect of negative 
externalities will be limited in new projects concerning natural environments. 
Additionally, Nord Stream 2 AG publicizes its stakeholder engagement plans for 
four out of the five EU member states whose EEZ will be affected by the pipeline project 
(Nord Stream 2, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e). The individual engagement plans are 
structured similarly: Under the engagement process, the corporation commits itself to 
comply with national regulatory requirements, requirements of the internal conventions, 
as well as the International Finance Corporation Performance Standards in each of the 
countries. Each document concludes with the identification of possible stakeholders, 
information about public hearings, and a detailed public and governmental information 
and engagement plan. 
The corporation’s formulated intention to invite non-governmental environmental 
organizations to join the consultation process shows the corporation’s willingness to 
engage in more extensive discussion. The corporation explains the monitoring procedure 
as part of its stakeholder engagement plans (exemplary, Nord Stream 2, 2017d: 40), but 
it does not include clear formulations for the monitoring process of its commitments 
following the end of the consultation phase. The corporation regularly publishes 
economic and environmental documents concerning the Nord Stream 2 pipelines but fails 
to specify which person within the corporate structure or at an external institution will be 
responsible for ensuring the commitments (Nord Stream 2, 2017f). The corporation has 
not expressed its intent to publish a regular report on its environment and economic 
commitments which would have addressed the credibility issues and improved long-term 
interaction with civil society. 
Like Nord Stream 2 AG, the investing corporations refer to international reporting 
frameworks for their non-mandatory disclosure. Four out of the five corporations use the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) standards to guide the reporting and membership with 
the UN Global Compact Standards is common (cf. appendices 1-6: ‘Monitoring’). But 
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even within the standardized reporting GRI structures, there can be found differences in 
the corporations’ approaches. For example, Shell and OMV choose to report in line with 
the more specific GRI G4 Oil and Gas sector supplements whereas Uniper G4 relies on 
the GRI Standard 103 guideline (ibid.). The corporations also refer to a range of different 
industry associations, such as the International Association of Oil & Gas Producers (Shell 
Global, 2018a) which provide their corporate members with different requirements 
(Shell, 2018a). Uniper even instated an internal task force on climate-related financial 
disclosure to ensure the monitoring of its energy transition commitments (Uniper SE). 
 
4.3.2 Transparency 
 
At first sight, the voluntary commitments seem to be supported by stable 
monitoring. External assurance and independent reviews are a part of all corporations’ 
monitoring processes. Some of the corporations opt for external assurance by consulting 
companies (cf. appendices 2-5, ‘Monitoring’), and Shell appoints an independent report 
review panel which comments on the corporate sustainability report (cf. appendix 6: 
‘Monitoring’). The corporations clearly attribute responsibility for enforcing their 
voluntary commitments within their corporate structures, and all of them include the 
board of directors into the monitoring process (table 2). However, when examining the 
intricate details of the corporate monitoring approaches, the metrics and processes used 
to measure their implementations are non-transparent at four out of the five examined 
corporations. Shell’s independent report review panel points out that the focus on 
successes rather than risks or failures in the corporate sustainability report means that the 
depth of the commitments remains shallow despite referencing international frameworks 
(Shell, 2018a: 8-9). 
Best practice could be observed in the OMV sustainability report which 
showcased the corporation’s successes and failures concerning its commitment objectives 
measured against the previous year (cf. appendix 3: ‘Monitoring’). But even at OMV, the 
missing transparency concerning the commitments becomes clear when examining the 
monitoring processes for clear sanctions. None of the surveyed corporations state clearly 
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how non-compliance with voluntary commitments will be sanctioned and resorted to 
internal rather than public proceedings in cases of non-compliance (cf. appendix 2-6: 
‘Monitoring’). Even though the investing corporations showcase more detailed voluntary 
commitments and attribute responsibility within the corporate structure appropriately, the 
clear long-term credibility of their commitments remains as undefined as at Nord Stream 
2 AG. 
 
4.4 Willpower 
 
A “strong financial foundation” (Shell International Limited, 2014: 4) and overall 
“good financial health” (ENGIE, 2018a: 28) will be necessary for the corporations to be 
able and willing to dedicate resources to voluntary self-regulation. Corporate efforts to 
ensure responsible behavior and contribute to investment in sustainable products outside 
of legally enforced regulation will only be financially viable if they are financed with 
available resources and contribute to overall profitability. Since self-regulation addresses 
long-term and mostly intangible assets, prioritizing self-regulation under financial 
pressure cannot be deemed a rational corporate activity. The analysis of the independent 
variable willpower and its effect on self-regulation in the examined corporations 
showcased two findings: (1) Low petroleum trade prices increased the financial pressure 
on all corporations, meaning fewer resources were available to be dedicated to voluntary 
self-regulation commitments, and (2) all of the surveyed corporations deem self-
regulation, especially concerning the energy transition, to be a contributing factor to long-
term profitability. 
 
4.4.1 Economic Environment 
 
The profitability of international petroleum corporations has been strongly 
affected by low oil and gas prices. Since the oil price dropped from $100/barrel in 2014 
to $30/barrel in early 2016 (OECD/IEA, 2017), prices have stabilized around $40-50 and 
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steadily increased in the second half of 2017 (Nasdaq, 2018b). With the first half of 2018 
coming to an end, the price remains stable around the $60-65 mark (ibid.). Due to the 
linkage between oil and gas prices, the volatility has also affected the profitability of gas 
trade and placed an even heavier financial burden on petroleum corporations (OPEC, 
2018). The examined corporations struggled to reach the break-even point in their 
petroleum sourcing throughout 2015 and 2016, but strategic adjustments like investment 
in petroleum sourcing in low-production-cost fields and stronger partnerships with 
foreign corporations helped to stabilize revenue and profit streams as early as 2017 (table 
1). One exception within the investing corporations is Uniper. The corporation was only 
founded in 2015 and has been engaged in fending off a hostile take-over bid by Finnish 
energy corporation Fortum (Uniper, 2018: 3; 2017b).  
 
Table 3: Profit and revenue streams of investing corporations in 2016 and 2017, 
Source: Author’s own elaborations based on corporate profiles (cf. appendices 1-6). 
 Revenue 2017 Profit 2017 Revenue 2016 Profit 2016 
Nord Stream 2 - - - - 
Uniper €72,745 million €-538 million €67,285 million -€3,234 million 
OMV €20,222 million €853 million €19,260 million €183 million 
Wintershall €3,244 million €719 million €2,768 million €362 million 
ENGIE €65,029 million €2,238 million €64,840 million €163 million 
Shell €254,040 million* €11,184 million* €194,448 million €3,977 million 
*lower depreciation and amortization and lower exploration expenses 
 
Generally, the default risk for Nord Stream 2 receivables is perceived as lower 
than comparable investments by Uniper which indicates trust in the project’s financial 
stability (Uniper SE, 2018a: 59). Since Nord Stream 2 AG does not publish an annual 
financial report, the current expenses and predicted profitability of the gas pipeline project 
cannot be determined based on public material.4 Uniper and Wintershall disclosed that 
                                                          
4 Future publications of annual reports cannot be expected since Nord Stream AG has never published 
annual reports either. 
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€285 million and €324 million, respectively, of their individually pledged €950 million 
has been withdrawn by the corporate management of Nord Stream 2 AG (ibid.: 34; 
Wintershall, 2018a: 10). Based on the publicly available information, no general 
assumption of the investment flows can be made except for that the project is progressing 
with its €8 billion investment in the current state of the gas market (Nord Stream 2, 
2017a). 
 
4.4.2 Energy Transition 
 
The economic environment of the examined petroleum corporations has been 
evaluated as recovering at the current moment. Therefore, investing in voluntary self-
regulation cannot be deemed a rational choice since the restrictions will likely hamper the 
corporations’ financial recovery by occupying resources and limiting business 
opportunities. As a prerequisite for corporate self-regulation, voluntary commitments will 
have to contribute to the overall maxim of profit maximization to be considered an 
economically rational choice. As mentioned in the theoretical framework, the intangible 
assets of reputation and first-mover advantage will affect long-term profitability 
positively and incentivize the corporations to engage in self-regulation (Williams, 2004). 
The collected data indicates that these intangible assets play an important role in the 
current business strategy of Nord Stream 2 and the investing corporations. Their corporate 
focus relies heavily on positioning the corporate brand as favorable with regulators as 
possible and embracing voluntary self-regulation measures as part of serving changing 
energy demands in context of the energy transition (appendix 2-6). 
The corporations involved in the Nord Stream 2 project go far in elaborating the 
importance of a favorable reputation for the long-term profitability of their operations. 
OMV states that CSR will help the corporation to “maintain (the company’s) license to 
operate and secure the social acceptance of (the company’s) operations” (OMV 
Aktiengesellschaft, 2017b: 3). Even Shell, a corporation notoriously known for the heavy 
environmental pollution of the Nigerian Ogoniland (Shell Nigeria, 2018), emphasizes its 
commitment to sustainability in its corporate responsibility communication (Shell, 2018a: 
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4). The mentioned matter of fact that their corporate self-regulatory standards lack 
specific long-term measurements and sanctions within the monitoring process underlines 
the public relations approach behind many of the voluntary commitments. Financial 
utility within a recovering economic environment will be ultimately maximized if the 
self-regulatory commitments only interfere with business operations as much as scrutiny 
threatens to expose irregularities. 
A slightly different approach can be observed in the corporations’ self-regulation 
regarding the energy transition. With national governments embracing less CO2-intensive 
energy mixes, the corporations have come to understand that focusing on the environment 
and sustainability constitutes a market opportunity (ENGIE, 2018a: 8-16; Wintershall, 
2017b: 23). By positioning their voluntary commitments in line with the increasing 
demand for less environmentally harmful energy products, the corporations will be able 
to improve their reputation as well as serve the future energy market better. All of the 
examined corporations heavily emphasize the contribution of their gas products in 
ensuring energy security within the EU market and achieving the new CO2 targets (cf. 
appendices 2-6: ‘Standards’). Similar to the other corporations, ENGIE indicates its 
transition to sustainability generated energy which will help combat long-term climate 
change (cf. appendix 5). But the investing corporation takes its self-regulatory approach 
one step further than all other examined corporations: The investing corporation 
proclaims its commitment to the Green Bonds Market to finance its energy transition 
projects which will focus on wind, solar, and hydroelectricity (ENGIE, 2018b: 29). 
Instead of perceiving self-regulation solely as a commitment benefiting society, the 
corporations openly acknowledge the opportunity for financing its shifting strategic focus 
in the long-term. The corporate strategy of conceiving the energy transition a business 
opportunity shows the importance of financial incentives for self-regulation and holds 
many interesting aspects for further discussion. But before continuing to the discussion, 
the general political environment of the Nord Stream 2 project will be examined in order 
to understand the complete picture of the factors influencing corporate self-regulation in 
the Nord Stream 2 project. 
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4.5 Motivation 
 
In the context of corporate behavior, the main source of motivation to self-regulate 
derives from the immediate political environment and the persistence of regulatory 
threats. General political opposition to the petroleum industry and specific resistance to 
the Nord Stream 2 project will likely impede the operations of the examined corporations. 
Self-regulation in favor of the political actors’ interest would be a rational response to 
avoid further regulatory risks. Within the political environment of Nord Stream 2, 
political interest revolves around the issues of EU energy dependence on Russia and 
energy mix changes within the context of action against climate change. Both issues 
motivate Nord Stream 2 and the investing corporations to self-regulate, with the former 
focusing on the foreign relations aspect and the latter seeking out market opportunities in 
the energy transition. 
 
4.5.1 Political Environment 
 
Political opposition towards the construction of Nord Stream 2 has been steadily 
increasing, and discussion of the proposed project has taken on a strong political nature 
(cf. appendix 1: ‘Motivation’). The first political argument against the pipelines is the 
continuing conflict between Ukraine and Russia and Russia’s power in avoiding Ukraine 
as a transit route for gas once Nord Stream 2 has come into operation (Reuters, 2018a). 
Secondly, the Polish government and then-U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson strongly 
criticized the project for its impact on EU energy independence (Tagesschau, 2018). Their 
main opposition centers on the increased supply of Russian gas to the EU market which 
could destabilize EU security and energy independence (Reuters, 2018b). The issue of 
energy independence has been hotly debated with the involvement of the Polish Office of 
Competition and Consumer Protection on request from Polish government as the latest 
political measure (UOKiK, 2018). Vice-President for the Energy Union Maroš Šefčovič 
stated that “Nord Stream 2 does not contribute to the Energy Union’s objectives” 
(European Commission, 2017b). When the organization sought a mandate to negotiate 
the key principles of the Nord Stream 2 project (Riley, 2016), the German government 
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assessed the involvement as outside of the Union’s area of competence since the initial 
Nord Stream project had been executed under national law (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2017; 
Bloomberg Markets, 2017). Whereas the European Commission distinctively mentioned 
a possible “legal void” or “the domination of (Russia’s) energy laws” as reasons for its 
intervention (European Commission, 2017b), an EU legal opinion issued in March 2018 
rejected the EU’s assessment and deemed the involvement of the EU in the project of 
Nord Stream 2 to be in breach of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (Reuters, 
2018c). 
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea defines international and national law 
in the continental shelf and open-water bodies called exclusive economic zones (EEZ). 
Part V, article 56 (1) of the convention states that “in the exclusive economic zone, the 
coastal State has (...) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, 
conserving and managing the natural resources (...)” (United Nations, 2018b). Article 75 
defines the range of the EEZ as maximum 200 nautical miles from the coast of the 
respective state. The exclusive rights of the state are extended under article 59 “to 
authorize and regulate the construction, operation and use of (...) (b) installations and 
structures for the purposes provided for in article 56 and other economic purposes” (ibid.). 
Regarding Nord Stream 2, the definition of an EEZ is of specific importance. Based on 
the UN convention, the EU member states whose EEZs are affected by the pipeline 
construction and operation have the sovereign right to deny Nord Stream 2 AG the 
commercial use of their territories and denies competency to the EU. Therefore, although 
the examined corporations are headquartered in five different European countries (Nord 
Stream 2 AG in Switzerland, Uniper and Wintershall in Germany, OMV in Austria, 
ENGIE in France, and Shell in the Netherlands), the immediate political environment of 
the Nord Stream 2 project will be shaped by the affected EU member states of Finland, 
Sweden, Denmark, and Germany (cf. appendix 1).5 
  
                                                          
5 The EEZ of Russia will also be affected, but the country has been excluded from the research as 
elaborated in the methodology section. 
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4.5.2 Political Interest 
 
Within the group of affected EU member states, Denmark and Germany stand out 
based on their respective opposition and support to the Nord Stream 2 project. The 
political opposition in the Danish senate has already led to tension with the Russian 
government (EUobserver, 2017). The law proposal L43 of the Danish parliament led to a 
change in Danish national law requiring permission from the energy, security, and 
environment ministry to build “certain pipelines (visse rørledningsanlæg))” (Folketinget, 
2017) in Danish national territorial waters (Energi-, Forsynings- og Klimaministeriet, 
2017). The delays in the permitting process based on this sudden legal change has raised 
questions of symbolic politics towards Russia (Energi-, Forsygnings- og Klimaudvalget, 
2017-18; Energistyrelsen, 2017; Altinget, 2017). In contrast to the Danish opposition, the 
German government has been traditionally supportive of the Nord Stream 2 project. The 
government’s interest in becoming the energy hub for Russian gas through the Baltic Sea 
has shaped the country’s political support ever since the construction and successful 
operation of the Nord Stream pipelines (Die Bundesregierung, 2018). In April 2018, 
German chancellor Angela Merkel voiced her concerns regarding the Russia-Ukraine gas 
disputes and the political nature of the Nord Stream 2 project (Reuters, 2018b). At the 
same time, Nord Stream 2 AG had already received all necessary permits from the 
German government in March 2018 which, overall, confirms governmental support for 
the gas pipeline project (Nord Stream 2, 2018a). Germany can be considered an economic 
heavyweight within the EU compared to Denmark and wields great influence within the 
EU based on its economic power (Eurostat, 2017a). However, due to the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, both member states have a veto right in the Nord Stream 2 project 
and should be considered for their political interest. 
 
Table 4: German and Danish political interest regarding energy and environmental policy, 
Source: Eurostat (2017a, 2017b); Yale University (2018b). 
 
Share in EU 
GDP (%) 
Energy import dependence Environmental Performance Index 
General (%) Gas (%) Value (out of 100) Place (out of 180) 
Denmark 1.9 13.9 -44.4 81.60 3 
Germany 21.1 63.5 88.6 78.37 13 
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Surveying the political environments of Germany and Denmark showed striking 
differences in the countries’ dependence on energy and specifically gas imports and 
environmental standard. Germany has been seeking to push the agenda of the Nord 
Stream 2 project from the beginning. This does not come as a surprise when examining 
the country’s current and future energy mix. With 63.5 percent of energy imports, 
Germany heavily depends on foreign energy sources. Compared to Denmark with only 
13.9 percent of imported energy, the dependency is quite distinct. When inspecting the 
specific dependency on imported gas, the picture becomes even clearer: Germany 
depends heavily on gas imports to meet its national energy demands). In contrast, 
Denmark consistently exports gas and will likely not benefit from increased gas imports 
to the EU. (Eurostat, 2017b) Nord Stream 2 might even hamper the export of Danish 
surplus gas to one of its main buyers, Germany (ICF International, 2012: 32-33). 
The examined corporations see the main regulatory risk in the CO2-market and 
the country-specific interests (cf. appendices 2-6; ENGIE, 2018a: 37). Balancing 
environmental and economic objectives has led to policy challenges in Germany and 
Denmark, but both states show a strong commitment to environmental protection. In the 
Environment Performance Index (Yale University, 2018b), both rank in the top 20 out of 
180 surveyed countries and Denmark stands out with exceptionally high scores. 
Regarding the means to counteract climate change, the Danish and the German 
government show clear differences in the preferred national energy mix. Denmark seeks 
complete independence of coal, oil, and gas resources by 2050 and has been reducing its 
CO2 emissions drastically (Energistyrelsen, 2018; Retsinformation, 2016). Germany, on 
the other hand, will support medium-term changes in the national energy mix with 
imported gas in the future while searching for more sustainable and renewable energy 
alternatives (Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit, 
2005). 
The strong focus on decarbonization and stricter climate protection regulations in 
European core markets poses a regulatory risk specific to the involved corporations. The 
risk will be two-fold: Stricter climate-protection policies in the main European markets 
will pose a financial and reputational risk for petroleum corporations and continuous 
investment in environmentally unfriendly energy sources will likely deter institutional 
investment (Uniper, 2018a: 96-10; ENGIE 2018a: 37). The first risk affects the 
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corporations equally, and self-regulation regarding CO2-emission can be seen in all of 
the investing corporations. All the examined corporations emphasize their contribution to 
reducing CO2-emission through their product portfolio and emphasize their commitment 
to shifting their sourcing and distribution focus to gas (cf. appendices 1-6: ‘Standards’). 
The corporations argue that replacing coal with natural gas will enable the EU member 
states to achieve their collective environmental and climate change targets. The economic 
claim made by Nord Stream 2 AG exemplarily states that the new gas transportation line 
between Russia and Germany “would save about 14 percent of total EU CO2 emissions” 
(Nord Stream 2, 2017a). 
The second risk will be more specific to energy corporations with a stronger 
reliance on institutional investors in their ownership structure like OMV and ENGIE (cf. 
appendices 3 and 5: ‘Willpower’). Their motivation to self-regulate and shift their 
business focus according to political interest is even more pronounced than at the other 
corporations which are predominantly privately held or corporate subsidiaries. The 
allocation of ENGIE’s earnings from its share buyback program to employee saving 
schemes is a recent example of an institutional investor exerting its influence on the 
corporate strategy (ENGIE, 2017b). The direct influence of stakeholders on corporate 
behavior can also be observed in Nord Stream 2 AG addressing the Ukrainian gas transit 
system (Nord Stream, 2017g). The heated discussion of the Nord Stream 2 project aiding 
Russian foreign interest, first and foremost, has put the corporation under pressure to 
address the criticism and take a stand on the issue. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
 
After analyzing the corporate self-regulation of Nord Stream 2 AG and the 
investing corporations according to the four psychological self-regulation categories, the 
discussion will now turn to the interpretation of the empirical findings. The most common 
sources of self-regulation within the examined petroleum corporations were corporate 
standards of conduct and compliance codes for general guidance as well as corporate 
social responsibility reports for specific self-regulation information (cf. appendices 1-6: 
‘Main sources of public information’). Some corporate commitments were first assumed 
to be self-regulation when, in fact, the behavior was prescribed by international 
conventions with the affected national governments as signatories. The need for a holistic 
understanding of the examined industry and associated national and international 
regulation before progressing with the empirical data collection became apparent. The 
research showcased the financial self-interest behind all forms of corporate self-
regulation and supported the economic assumption of utility maximization as the main 
corporate objective. Factors found to influence corporate utility were reputational and 
regulatory risks as well as market opportunities arising from first-mover advantages. The 
empirical findings were in line with the discussed theoretical framework, but the use of 
international frameworks and the idea of self-regulation through green bonds stood out 
within the research. As seen in the corporate self-regulation of investing corporation 
ENGIE, the green bonds market seeking to advance both social and corporate interest 
might be a viable strategy to overcome the credibility problems associated with corporate 
self-regulation in the international petroleum industry (cf. appendix 5). The section will 
discuss the empirical findings in the categories standards and monitoring, set them into 
context with help of the independent variables willpower and motivation, and conclude 
by showcasing the possibility of combining societal and corporate interest in the form of 
green bonds in the petroleum sector. 
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5.1 Standards 
 
In line with Baumeister and Vohs (2007: 3), the corporate standards and CSR 
statements of the examined corporations showcased the ideal behavior the corporations 
aspire to abide by. The theoretical framework had anticipated self-regulation in a wide 
array of issues; environment and sustainability, human rights and labor rights, finances 
and taxation, workplace safety, anti-corruption and anti-bribery, and diversity (OECD, 
2001; OECD, 2011). All of the examined issues could have possibly held financial 
relevance for the corporation within their internal and external environment. The 
research, however, showed that all of the examined corporations focus extensively on 
environmental, climate change, and work safety issues in their self-regulation. Most of 
them do not even publicly mention the issue of taxation. The findings indicated that 
political pressure was determining in the setting of priorities in the content of the 
corporation’s self-regulation.  
 
5.1.1 Nord Stream 2 
 
Nord Stream 2 publicly commits to compliance with all national legislation 
concerning biodiversity and environmental protection (Nord Stream 2, 2018b). 
Furthermore, the corporation made its political engagement plans for the EEZ affected by 
the pipeline project public (Nord Stream 2, 2018e). Aside from touching on labor safety 
in the construction and operation process of the pipelines, the environment remains the 
only focus of the corporation (cf. appendix 1). In light of the tense relations between 
Russia and the EU as well as the US (ibid.), the question arises why Nord Stream 2 AG 
does not self-regulate more extensively in other areas than environmental issues. The 
issue of foreign security raised by the Danish government has not received special 
attention in the corporate self-regulation process (Folketinget 2017), and the Nord Stream 
2 AG refrained from actively taking a stand on the EU seeking to extend its competence 
area to include the project. 
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This self-regulative approach can be explained by reference to the political 
environment of Nord Stream 2 AG: The corporation has ample support from the Russian 
government which depends on the pipelines for increased export of gas to the EU. Russia 
firmly backs the Nord Stream 2 project and seeks to support the project’s implementation 
within the EU through the foreign affairs department. In the case of the permitting 
process, the Russian government sought to influence the policy-making process in 
Denmark when the Danish parliament voiced its concerns about national security 
problems (EUobserver, 2017). Within the EU, the German government and EU legal 
instances have taken a firm stance that regulation of the pipeline project should remain 
an issue of national sovereignty, limiting regulation to the individual member states 
(Reuters, 2018c). The support of the German government has extended further due to the 
perceived economic benefits of access to Russian gas for German manufacturing 
industries and country’s political rapprochement with Russia (Die Bundesregierung, 
2018). 
Because the affected national legislations concern themselves widely with 
environmental issues when concerned with their coastal waters, Nord Stream 2 AG only 
had to react to the regulatory risk of not complying with the environmental standards 
sufficiently. The empirical analysis of the self-regulation in the case of Nord Stream 2 
showed that there was a strong emphasis on the issue of environmental protection and 
sustainability (cf. appendix 2). Most of the corporate communication, which could be 
deemed an approach towards a self-regulatory regime, was driven by the corporation’s 
need to emphasize its compliance with and care for the flora and fauna affected by the 
construction and operation of the twin pipelines. The regulatory risk of not receiving the 
necessary construction permissions from the EU member states whose EEZ will be 
crossed by the pipelines endangers the entire investment of EUR 9.5 billion in the Nord 
Stream 2 project (Nord Stream 2, 2018e). Communicating the corporation’s dedication to 
upholding national and international standards and going the extra mile to ensure 
environmental protection and stability can be deemed a rational reaction according to the 
theoretical incentive structure proposed by Williams (2004). Reputation has long been 
underestimated as an economic asset in the strive for profit maximization, but the high 
costs associated with maintaining a compliant and friendly reputation can hold high 
benefits for individual corporations and the entire industry in the long-run (Haufler, 
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2001). At the same time, bolstering the reputation of the gas industry as a contributor to 
energy security and safe and environmentally friendly energy (Nord Stream 2, 2018f) can 
only be in the interest of the investing corporations headquartered in the EU.  
Although the political environment seemed rather business-friendly at first, the 
rising opposition within the Danish senate posed a regulatory risk (Energi-, Forsynings- 
og Klimaministeriet, 2017). The sovereign right of the government to grant private rights 
and property to the corporations shows the ultimate strength of the regulating entity. As 
Parkinson (1995: 30-31) was cited in the literature review: Private power “may be 
legitimately held only for the purpose of furthering the public good”. The Danish 
government amending its interpretation of the UN Law of the Sea to include other factors 
such as security issues could have been a serious threat to the Nord Stream 2 project. 
However, the threat of more extensive regulation could be considered low due to two 
reasons: (1) Denmark will likely remain alone with its political opposition to the pipeline 
project. The Danish government was hoping for backing from the EU to solve the political 
issue of the pipeline construction. The European Commission and Poland had demanded 
more extensive regulation (European Commission, 2017a; Reuters, 2018b), and with their 
support, the Danish government could have backed its own stance and possibly deferred 
the decision-making process to the EU level. However, since the involvement of the EU 
was rejected by its own legal instances (Reuters 2018c), the likelihood of this scenario 
has been reduced greatly. (2) The possibility remains to delineate the Nord Stream 2 
pipelines on a different route to avoid crossing the Danish EEZ. If the pipelines were to 
be constructed north of the coastal territory surrounding the Danish island Bornholm, the 
Danish government would not have the right to interfere with the construction of the 
pipelines. The proposed route would be more efficient and, therefore, the preferred 
alternative for Nord Stream 2 AG. But having the possibility of alternative routes which 
would exclude Denmark from the negotiation table reduces the political threat to the 
project immensely. (OSW, 2017) Because the Nord Stream 2 project is limited to the 
specific EEZs and their legislations (United Nations, 2018a and 2018b) and the project 
has already received the most necessary permits, especially from the supporting 
stakeholder Germany (Nord Stream 2, 2018a), the political pressure does not necessitate 
more extensive self-regulation than regarding environmental issues at this point. 
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5.1.2 Investing Corporations 
 
In contrast to Nord Stream 2 AG, the content of self-regulation in the investing 
corporations covers a wide array of issues. The sustainability and governance reports of 
the investing corporation addresses corporate behavior in, among others, the energy 
transition, the management of its operations abroad, safety issues, business principles 
concerning contractors and suppliers, and taxation (cf. appendices 1-6). The approach of 
addressing more topics and elaborating them more in-depth can be partly attributed to the 
fact that governance structures develop over time and that the investing corporations 
operate in a more diverse political environment. Their projects span the entire world with 
different stakeholders and governments involved who will have their own requirements 
and expectations regarding the construction and operation of petroleum activities. 
Therefore, the self-regulative behavior of the investing corporations is shaped more by 
established international standards regulating the behavior of multinational corporations 
than national or bilateral legislation. The influence can be exemplarily observed in the 
corporate self-regulation in context of the Paris climate agreement which all investing 
corporations refer to in their self-regulation (cf. appendices 2-6: ‘Standards’). The 
agreement was signed by 195 member states in context of the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and proposed the limitation of global 
temperature rises to 1.5 degree Celsius (UNFCCC, 2018). The objective will be achieved 
by lowering the emission of CO2 in all signatory states which, in turn, includes the 
operation of petroleum multinationals (ibid.). Both in the process of oil production and 
the usage of the products, high CO2 emission are persistently affecting the global 
environment and climate spanning across national borders. These negative externalities 
can only be dealt with on an international level since their effect does not limit itself to 
artificially drawn national borders. The investing corporations tend to refer to the Paris 
Agreement in their reasoning for environmental self-regulation and partly adjust their 
strategic objectives (cf. appendices 2-6: ‘Standards’). 
An issue nearly completely avoided in the self-regulation process of the investing 
corporations is taxation. Tax avoidance in multinational corporations constitutes a 
common form of tax noncompliance and differs from tax evasion in so far that the strategy 
only employs legal means to reduce tax liability. However, the line distinguishing 
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between “unacceptable avoidance and legitimate mitigation” is highly debatable (The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1997: 3). However, opportunities for avoidance are not 
distributed “evenly across the tax paying population” and more available to multinational 
corporations which operate in different legislative environments (ibid.: 4). The 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has issued 
international guidelines on how transfer pricing within international corporate structure 
in order to provide corporations with standards for their tax compliance (OECD, 2017). 
Shell (2018a: 38) explicitly refers to the guidelines and assigns responsibility in form of 
an annual assessment by the board of directors, but remains strong on its assessment that 
it will seek the best taxation outcome for its own operation while “comply(ing) with 
applicable tax laws”. The same is stated by Uniper and OMV which refer to local laws as 
their main source of guidance on taxation issues (cf. appendices 2 and 3: ‘Taxation’) 
whereas Wintershall and ENGIE refrain from commenting on this economically 
important issue completely (cf. appendices 4 and 5: ‘Taxation’). The absence of any 
visible self-regulation in this area indicates the fine balance at multinationals between 
political pressure motivating behavioral change and the actual willpower to self-regulate. 
The issue of taxation is a factor with a direct and visible influence on corporate 
performance that any extensive corporate self-regulation concerning the corporate 
payment structure would be considered irrational. The findings clearly illustrate the 
“complex interaction between corporate strategy and regulatory requirements, 
particularly those related to financial disclosure and accounting”, discussed in the 
theoretical framework (Lambert, 2006: 54). 
Even in this short discussion of the empirical findings in Nord Stream 2 AG and 
the investing corporations, the difference in the stakeholders shaping the political 
environment of the individual corporations became evident. Nord Stream 2 AG operates 
in a very limited geographical area with clearly defined stakeholders. The political 
demands and regulation concerning the corporation’s behavior are more clearly defined 
which, in turn, leads to the corporation’s self-regulation being more specific. In case of 
the investing corporations, regulatory standards and legislation vary greatly between the 
political environments they operate in. Thus, self-regulation will focus more on 
international demands which are mostly non-binding and often vaguely defined. An 
example for this vagueness are the SDG goals which are quoted by four of the five 
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investing corporations as guiding their corporate behavior (United Nations 2018c; table 
1). The often-referenced goal of affordable and clean energy defines energy targets, as, 
for example, “by 2030, double the global rate of improvement in energy efficiency” 
(United Nations, 2018d). However, the goals often lack clear public measurements and 
sanctions in cases of non-compliance. Without the clear guidance, the corporations will 
be more inclined to follow national regulation and disregard the professed standards in 
cases of financially more beneficial projects contributing to corporate performance. 
 
5.2 Monitoring 
 
Regarding the research and public understanding of corporate self-regulation, the 
difficulty to distinguish between professed standards and actual corporate self-regulation 
remains the most pressing problem. The issue was addressed by turning to the second 
category of monitoring to establish the credibility of the voluntary commitments. The 
examination of corporate monitoring processes focused on the question if the self-
regulation of the examined corporations only constitutes white-washing efforts to veil 
corporate misbehavior or if the corporations credibly commit to the long-term 
implementation and monitoring of their professed commitments. The theoretical 
discussion has shown that monitoring structures are at the core of any credible voluntary 
commitment. Transparent and clear monitoring structures provide the foundation for 
effectively attributing responsibility and accountability to raise the awareness necessary 
to public self-regulation (Flohr, 2014: 204). 
The discussion has shown that it is of essential importance that corporations strive 
to clearly assign responsibility for the implementation and monitoring of their self-
regulative measures. In contrast to the practice of lobbying which seeks to influence 
political outcomes behind closed doors, self-regulation should not be averse to public 
scrutiny and, in fact, favor it for enforcement purposes (ibid.). Giavazzi (2014: 186) 
suggests that notifying the board of directors about the monitoring process and results 
concerning compliance should become a standard in the industry and external assessment 
should be strongly promoted. The research has shown that all examined corporations 
include the supervisory board or, alternatively, the board of directors in the self-regulation 
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compliance process and assign the reporting and monitoring procedures to a specific 
position, such as a chief compliance officer or sustainability officer (table 2). The example 
of Shell has shown that inviting external review can assist the corporation in achieving 
its individually selected standards by providing objective assessment (Shell, 2018a: 8-9). 
Despite the apparent differences in operation, location, and size, the exploratory 
research only shows slight differences between Nord Stream 2 AG and the investing 
corporations: Clear measurements of voluntary commitments and sanctioning of non-
compliance remains an issue (cf. appendices 1-6). The stakeholder engagement plans 
devised by Nord Stream 2 AG include the attribution of responsibility during the different 
phases of permitting, construction, and operation. Exemplarily, the engagement plan 
concerning Denmark indicates that Nord Stream 2 AG will be responsible for the transfer 
of the monitoring and environmental results during construction to the appropriate 
authorities (Nord Stream 2, 2017b: 24-25). The attribution of responsibility in these cases 
creates a certain degree of transparency to civil society and other involved stakeholders. 
However, the corporation does not indicate how these processes will be monitored in the 
internal corporate structure or which position in the internal hierarchical structure will be 
accountable for the compliance process.6 The corporation compiles its information in 
documents concerning specific issues, but a comprehensive overview and regular account 
of self-regulation measures is not being published at the moment. 
 
One could argue that these processes would follow along with the maturity 
process of a corporation. Internal structures become more evident, compliance and 
monitoring processes are being assigned, and specific positions for external affairs and 
compliance are being created. Nord Stream 2 AG claims that improved technology and 
industry consensus regarding relevant standards facilitated the implementation and 
monitoring of environmental measures within its operations (Nord Stream 2, 2018b). The 
previous experience with the construction of the Nord Stream pipelines through the Baltic 
seabed provided the corporation with best practice methods for planning the route of the 
Nord Stream 2 pipeline project (Nord Stream, 2017a). The corporation also points out the 
improvement in technology for data collection which facilitates both monitoring 
compliance of binding as well as non-binding regulation (ibid.). 
                                                          
6 It could be generally assumed the CEO, but a public indication is missing.  
61 
 
 
At first sight, the professionalism of the investing corporations’ sustainability 
reports indicates a similar trend. The corporations assign responsibility and accountability 
throughout their self-regulation governance structures and include the board of directors 
(table 2). This approach is in line with the recommendations to provide compliance 
information to the board and responsible management as an important first step to prevent 
non-compliance (Lambert, 2006: 19). Especially the sustainability report of Shell stood 
out in its comprehensiveness and inclusion of an External Review Committee (ERC) 
providing an objective evaluation of the sustainability efforts of the corporation (Shell 
2018a: 6-9). In the sustainability report of 2016, the ERC pointed out how Shell’s 
intention on contributing to the management of climate change was often at odds with the 
corporation’s economic strategy and not fully transparent on how to gain “investor 
support for progressively increasing and accelerating investment in low-carbon 
alternatives” (Shell, 2017b: 71). The case of the ERC underlines Shell’s intention to self-
regulate its own corporate behavior and commit to its self-regulation measures. At the 
same time, the existence of the ERC showcases the profound difficulties in determining 
the motivation behind self-regulative corporate behavior. In the early 2000s, Shell had 
chosen to ignore appropriate internal controls which resulted in a $120 million settlement 
with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2004). The corporation decided to commit $5 million to extend its internal 
compliance program with the ERC a part of this self-regulative approach. The politically 
encouraged implementation of this supportive external monitoring layer shows that 
monitoring self-regulative commitments comes at a high financial cost and will require 
either political pressure or strong economic incentives as an incentive for implementation. 
 
The empirical analysis showed that comparable economic incentives are few since 
the investing corporations mainly focus on pursuing the objective of profit maximization. 
The financial commitment of the investing European corporations is heavily incentivized 
by the business opportunity of increasing gas demand in EU member states (cf. 
appendices 2-6: ‘Standards’). By strengthening their competitiveness within the EU and 
meeting the demand in gas with help of Nord Stream 2, the increasing demand in future 
decades will be able to be met by the corporations (Nord Stream 2, 2018f). In committing 
the considerable resources of approximately €9.5 billion to the approval and construction 
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process of the pipelines, the European corporations create barriers to market entry in the 
European gas market and invest in the future profitability of their own business, aside 
from all political reasons. In combination with the low oil and gas market prices, the 
willpower of Nord Stream 2 AG to self-regulate and monitoring commitments in the long-
term was therefore estimated to be quite low. Like Nord Stream 2 AG, the investing 
corporations have to deal with profitability issues in the international oil and gas markets 
(table 3). At the same time, the corporations are faced with the increasing reputational 
and financial risk of investing in petroleum sourcing under the international energy 
transition.  
 
 
5.3 International Frameworks 
 
The research findings painted a rather somber picture of corporate self-regulation. 
The permanent focus on profit maximization leaves little willpower to engage in self-
regulation except for circumstances of intensive political pressure. The case study of Nord 
Stream 2 and its investing corporations underlined that only immediate and specific 
political pressure has an effect on corporate self-regulative behavior in the petroleum 
industry. The moment political interest concerning a specific corporate behavior declines, 
the corporations will refrain from self-regulating their behavior. In like manner, political 
pressure from civil society is rarely sustained in the long-term due to the inherent problem 
of unfavorable cost-benefit ratios in larger groups (Olson, 1965: 49). The decrease in 
political pressure will lead to corporations focusing on veiling irresponsible behavior in 
the short- and mid-term and largely ignoring long-term monitoring of their social, 
environmental, and governance engagement as seen in the empirical analysis (cf. 
appendices 1-6: ‘Monitoring’). 
 
An important first step would be the creation of an internationally valid and 
binding framework for sustainability and self-regulative reporting. The EU has taken first 
steps in this direction by implementing the directive on disclosure of non-financial and 
diversity information by certain large companies (European Parliament, 2014). The 
directive requires corporations with more than 500 employees to report on various issues, 
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for instance, their environmental impact, observance of human and labor rights, and anti-
corruption measures. The directive fits into the greater picture of the renewed EU strategy 
2011-14 for Corporate Social Responsibility which sought to enhance the visibility of 
corporate social responsibility measures within the EU (European Commission, 2011). 
The European Parliament refers further to the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and holds them up as “the most credible international CSR standard”. 
(European Parliament, 2013). As part of the OECD initiative, the OECD National Contact 
Points (NCP) in the signatory states provide guidance on the implementation of the 
guidelines and effectively support the EU and national engagement with international 
corporations on national territory. (OECD, 2016: 11-18). Similarly, the efforts of the 
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) have proven successful in establishing sustainability 
reporting at major corporations (GRI, 2018) with four out of five investing corporations 
employing the initiative’s frameworks (cf. table 2). 
 
But even with the elaborate GRI framework as a foundation, the problem of 
standardizing and ensuring self-regulation efforts arises. The corporations employ 
different sets of reporting matrixes which they adapt to their own needs. A certain degree 
of comparability can be assumed when the corporations use the same general reporting 
approach. However, the sanctioning of non-compliance still remains excluded from these 
initiatives. Although the mentioned EU directive requires corporations to report on their 
due diligence processes (European Parliament, 2014: article 1), the methodology 
guidelines remain non-binding (ibid., 2014: article 2). Thus, the corporations ultimately 
remain accountable only to themselves. The OECD (2011: 26) states in its guidelines for 
multinational enterprises that “self-regulation (...) should not unlawfully restrict 
competition, nor should they be considered a substitute for effective law and regulation 
by governments”. Domestic law and regulation will always take precedence with the 
organization encouraging the corporations to embrace the international guidelines in all 
of their corporate behavior worldwide (ibid.: 17). The organization’s NCPs must not take 
on the function of a judicial body and solely base their influence on the reputational effect 
of their recommendations on the behavior of the examined corporations (OECD, 2016: 
14). Still, the research has shown the powerful and coercive nature of political pressure 
on corporate behavior. In addition to the increased involvement in the policy area of self-
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regulation, the prospect of using “energy output and technology to promote (EU) global 
interests” (Foreign Affairs, 2015) and the objective of reducing CO2 emission in favor of 
renewable, clean energy sources (Uniper SE, 2017b: 14) will likely create incentives for 
the EU to consolidate its influence further in the area of energy. Thus, the self-regulative 
behavior of examined corporations will likely be affected by the EU’s increasing 
involvement in both policy areas. 
 
Although the theoretical framework indicates that motivation in form of political 
pressure can provide a substitute for corporate willpower (Baumeister and Vohs, 2007: 
4), the empirical findings underline that researchers and policy-makers should pay 
increased attention to the financial self-interest of the individual corporations instead of 
purely increasing political pressure. The political denunciation of irresponsible corporate 
governance does not necessarily lead to more responsible governance in the future, but 
usually incentivizes more responsible behavior in other non-monetary and non-business 
crucial categories (Kotchen and Moon, 2011: 13). Kolk and van Tulder (2002: 269) 
already show that the reputational risk of not adopting child labor codes could be greater 
than the public criticism the corporations would be facing in case of non-compliance with 
the professed standards. The declaration of sustainable objectives is regarded as necessary 
in the face of political pressure whereas monitoring and ensuring long-term viability of 
the standards remains optional all too often. Therefore, special attention should be paid 
to enabling efficient monitoring processes within the individual corporations and the 
industry itself. 
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5.4 Green Bonds Market 
 
Corporate self-regulation which effectively and credibly contributes to society as 
an addition to traditional government regulation will only be possible if the corporations 
find ways to deal with the business-restricting nature of responsible corporate behavior. 
The research indicated that focusing on corporate financial self-interest might hold new 
insights into the emergence of credible self-regulation. As Smith (1776, 2008: 25) was 
quoted in the theoretical framework, “it is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the 
brewer, or the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own 
interest”. The essential role of financial pressure in the emergence of corporate self-
regulation was visible in the confrontation between the executive board of Shell and more 
than 90 percent of its shareholders who opposed the setting of emission targets which 
were not in line with the Paris Climate Agreement (The Independent, 2017). An even 
more insightful example of self-regulation in the petroleum industry is the issuance of 
green bonds observed in the empirical analysis of the investing corporation ENGIE 
(2018b). Green bonds are bonds earmarked for environmentally friendly projects within 
the corporate structure of international corporations and states (Climate Bonds, 2018). 
The invested sum is backed by the issuer’s entire balance sheet and credit rating like any 
other bond, but can only be invested into specific green projects (ibid.). The visibility of 
the green bonds market has been steadily increasing with Oslo Børs becoming the first 
stock exchange to list them separately from traditional bonds (Oslo Børs, 2018).  
 
The process of identifying and prioritizing such green commitments is 
exemplarily described in the Oslo Børs guidance on reporting of corporate responsibility 
(Oslo Børs, 2016): The Norwegian stock exchange recommends a materiality analysis 
which includes the definition of the corporation’s most important stakeholders and 
mapping their interests. In combination with the corporation’s policies and strategies, the 
corporation’s economic, environmental, and social impacts, as well as internationally 
agreed standards, the corporation will then prioritize the significance of each possible 
commitment. Concerning the implementation, the guide points out the importance of 
selecting indicators for each commitment in order to be able to ensure the systematic 
monitoring of the self-regulative measures. The final presentation of the voluntary 
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commitments should then be accurate, transparent, and reliable. The recommendations of 
Oslo Børs represent best practice of voluntary self-regulation. The approach is 
comprehensive, considers the interests of stakeholders while balancing them with the 
interests of the corporation, and is informed by an understanding of the corporation as a 
responsible actor in society. Materiality assessment are widely used corporate tools in 
identifying sustainability issues and can be effectively used to uncover profitable 
sustainability opportunities within existing corporate structures (cf. appendices 2, 3, and 
6). 
 
ENGIE has been one of the first movers in the petroleum industry to adopt the 
issuance of green bonds in 2014 (ENGIE, 2018b). The corporation has issued green bonds 
worth €5.25 billion until mid-2018 and has been using the invested sum to finance 
operational growth in renewable energy and energy efficiency projects (ENGIE, 2017c). 
The stakeholder and corporate responsibility analysis has been conducted internally and 
examined externally by Vigeo Eiris, a global provider of environmental, social and 
governance (ESG) analysis (Vigeo Eiris, 2018). Although ENGIE’s share of renewable 
energy generation remains low compared to the sector average, the green hybrid bonds 
are deemed to contribute positively to the sustainable development of the corporation’s 
portfolio (ibid.: 1-3). ENGIE’s approach illustrates the corporation’s move from a 
business model solely focused on petroleum sourcing to an environmentally friendlier 
strategy while, at the same time, not losing perspective of the corporate need for profit 
maximization (cf. appendix 5). The financing of corporate projects contributes to the 
declared self-regulation objectives of “providing access to sustainably generated energy, 
combating climate change, reducing its effect and making responsible use of natural 
resources” (ENGIE, 2018b). Thus, the corporation reacts to both political and economic 
pressure and focuses on the holistic funding of its self-regulation commitments. Since the 
global energy transition is deemed most material by the investing corporations (cf. Shell, 
2018a: 8-9), this approach to sustainability secures necessary funding to ensure the mid- 
and long-term viability of the corporation’s core business and voluntary commitments. 
 
The green bonds approach has the additional benefit of providing a firm 
framework for self-regulation. With the financial commitment to ESG investors, the 
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corporation will be limited to investing the funds in ESG projects (ENGIE, 2017c). 
Additionally, psychological research suggests that the process of individual self-
regulation only leads to a loss in energy when the commitment requires sustained and 
continuous effort (vanDellen, Hoyle, and Miller, 2012: 901). ENGIE’s strategy of issuing 
green bonds with a 5-year and 5-month, 11-year and 5-month, or 20-year maturity is 
therefore more promising in sustaining the corporation’s voluntary commitments in the 
long-term than having to react to short-term pressure within the petroleum industry 
(ibid.). The problem of collective action, which heavily hampers the long-term 
commitment to voluntary objectives of self-regulation (Williams, 2004), will thus be 
countered by the financial commitment of the green bonds. 
 
Due to the increasing governmental focus on the energy transition (cf. 
Energistyrelsen, 2018; Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare 
Sicherheit, 2005; United Nations, 2015), institutional investors might not be interested in 
investing in corporations with a portfolio strongly relying on petroleum sources any 
longer. The interest of institutional stakeholders will likely increasingly include 
objectives such as environmental protection and renewable energy. A prominent example 
for this change in institutional investment is the state-owned Norwegian petroleum 
corporation Statoil which has gradually shifted its investment away from fossil resources 
to more renewable energy sources in step with the changing priorities in the Norwegian 
government (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2013). As mentioned in the case 
selection, Statoil has even decided to change its name to Equinor which indicates the 
strong move away from petroleum sources in the corporation’s portfolio. Although none 
of the examined corporations are currently at the same financially secure stage as Statoil 
to make similar financial and reputational investments (Statoil, 2018b), the self-regulative 
behavior of committing to green bonds may be an advantageous strategy for the 
corporation to maintain and showcase its strong reputation and ethical standards 
(Grasmick and Appleton, 1977). 
 
Besides providing ENGIE with a self-regulation opportunity rich in reputational 
benefit and associated with a lower financial default risk, the approach gives greater 
credibility to ENGIE’s overall corporate self-regulation. Because there is little financial 
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incentive to commit to sanctions and measurability, the discussed problem of credibility 
remains in all self-regulation measures. Williams (2004) suggests that collective industry 
action can help to address this specific issue, but the strategy has its own inherent 
problems associated with collective action. In contrast, green bonds provide a market-
based ESG solution which is accessible across industries and objectively comparable 
since the label green bonds is attached to quantifiable and objective measurements and is 
subject to external monitoring (Vigeo Eiris, 2018: 4). The stronger focus on monitoring 
ensures that the self-regulatory commitment to the energy transition and environmental 
protection will be translated into tangible project and will not merely remain a marketing 
statement. Relying on the green bond market as an instrument of social control alone will 
not have the regulatory effect comparable to traditional state regulation (Marcus, 1989), 
but it might be one valuable step contributing towards improved corporate self-regulation 
in the petroleum industry. To put it in the words of Paul Polman, CEO of Unilever: “The 
good thing is that, next to our moral obligations to address the global challenges, it is also 
an enormous business opportunity” (Forbes, 2017). 
 
 
5.5 Limitations and Further Research 
 
The research has certain limitations which will be pointed out before concluding 
the discussion with further research suggestions: A definite point of critique regarding the 
theoretical model is the macroeconomic assumption of self-regulation that regulated and 
regulating entity set their initial levels of acceptable regulation independent of each other. 
The research assumed that the political environment forms in a two-stage game without 
continuous contact between the players. However, established informal practices between 
private and public sector, as, for example, lobbying or the revolving door between 
ministerial and board member positions, skew this model in the practical setting. 
Regarding the Nord Stream 2 project, members of the German parliament have voiced 
their criticism of the employment of former German chancellor Gerhard Schröder by the 
corporations Nord Stream AG and Nord Stream 2 AG (Deutscher Bundestag, 2017). 
Schröder’s close connections to the political elite in Russia have both fostered mistrust in 
the German public society and most likely positively facilitated the progress of the Nord 
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Stream 2 project in the German political environment. The obscure nature of these 
informal practices affects the idealized market of regulation even before the actors will 
set their individual demands and contributes to an environment of asymmetric 
information impenetrably to objective decision-making and academic research (Downs, 
1957). 
 
Aside from these important limitations, the research of self-regulation in the Nord 
Stream 2 project and its investing corporations underlined the importance of analyzing 
the tension between political and economic interests when seeking to understand 
corporate self-regulation and added the insight that green bonds might be a valuable 
option to add credibility to the self-regulation of petroleum corporations outside of state-
mandated regulation. While reviewing and discussing the theoretical framework and the 
empirical findings, additional research ideas arose which hold the potential for further 
examining self-regulation and building on this particular research: 
 
Green bonds and ESG investment in different industries 
The prominence of self-regulation and specific self-regulatory issues varies from industry 
to industry and the de facto commitment to voluntary self-regulation from corporation to 
corporation. The practical examination of self-regulation will therefore always be 
hampered by variations and incoherence. This research has contributed to understanding 
self-regulation in petroleum sector more in-depth and uncovered the importance of the 
green bonds initiative to energy transition and environmental commitments. Further 
research could possibly focus on analyzing green bonds, ESG investment and the UN 
principles for responsible investing (PRI, 2017) in different industries and how the 
approaches connect to the proposed self-regulation of the individual corporations. 
Another possibility would be to focus on a specific issue of the increasing popularity of 
ESG investment in the petroleum industry following research approaches comparable to 
Manacorda, Centonze, and Forti (2014) and provide more specific insight into the 
petroleum sector. 
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Self-regulation from a constructivist point of view 
The third and last idea derives from the chosen positivist approach of this research. The 
assumption of economic rationality in analyzing empirical findings seems to exclude a 
constructivist point of view at first sight. However, the chosen approach does not negate 
that the economic reality of supply and demand as well as the marketplace in itself is 
constructed based on shared symbols, traditions, and reinforced beliefs. The research in 
this thesis could provide the foundation for examining the identity of a corporation in its 
constructed environment more in-depth and analyzing which social and cultural factors 
hamper or encourage self-regulation and, possibly, good citizenships behavior in 
international corporations. 
 
In constructivist psychology, self-regulation is viewed as being recursive, 
meaning that the process of decision-making in the context of self-regulation will lead to 
“a deep phenomenological sense of (...) personal identity” and vice versa (Mahoney and 
Marquis, 2002: 800). More simplified spoken, when individuals self-regulate their 
behavior to match their ideal standards, the behavior confirms their own understanding 
of themselves. In turn, the validated ideal condition induces and validates further self-
regulation. According to constructivist psychological research, however, this identity is 
predominantly shaped by the individual’s environment. Mahoney and Marquis (2002: 
800) are two of the most famous advocates of constructivist psychology which views self-
regulation as an activity “(...) mediated by language and symbol systems”. Constructivist 
researchers in this field view the individual’s relationships and traditions as the factors 
which will ultimately create meaning and organization for the individual’s “thought, 
feeling, and action” in self-regulation (Mahoney, 1991: 100-101; Mahoney, 2007: 249-
250). The identity to be validated by self-regulation is thus a construct of the individual’s 
environment. This is a highly relevant point in the understanding of self-regulation and 
could be possibly elaborated further on the foundation of the methodology of this 
research.  
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6 CONCLUSION 
 
 The research set out to study corporate self-regulation in the case of the gas 
pipeline project Nord Stream 2 with help of the theoretical framework of psychological 
self-regulation. The motivation to study this particular subject derived from the question 
why corporations choose to publicly commit to voluntary standards limiting their 
corporate behavior when traditional command-and-control state regulation is absent. The 
petroleum industry was chosen as the object of study because of the industry’s importance 
to society and its image as a notorious polluter of the environment. The case study 
selected within the industry focused on the gas pipeline project Nord Stream 2 and 
examining the voluntary self-regulation of the project-responsible corporation Nord 
Stream 2 AG and the investing corporations Uniper, OMV, Wintershall, ENGIE, and 
Shell.  
 
The first hypothesis of the research stated that corporate self-regulation in form 
of standards and monitoring will be motivated by political opposition and hampered by 
financial pressure. The assumption was based on the psychological concept of self-
regulation which separated the factors influencing self-regulation decisions into four 
categories: standards, monitoring, willpower, and motivation. Each category was defined 
based on psychological literature and adapted from human behavior to corporate behavior 
based on macroeconomic and microeconomic theory. The framework structured the ideal 
behavior the corporations seek to accomplish (standards) and their internal policing 
structures ensuring the long-term viability of their commitment (monitoring) as the two 
dependent variables of corporate self-regulation. According to the model, the self-
regulative behavior of the corporations would be affected by two independent variables: 
availability of financial resources to engage in self-regulation (willpower) and the 
political pressure within the immediate corporate environment (motivation). Corporations 
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would choose to self-regulate in order to preempt political action from regulating entities. 
If the regulated corporate entity decided to voluntarily commit to self-regulation 
measures, the costs of the regulating institution to enter the market of regulation and 
implement and monitor a similar regulation would increase. Thus, corporate self-
regulation would reduce the government’s incentive to regulate the market in the first 
place. 
 
The qualitative empirical analysis found that corporate self-regulation was indeed 
affected by the individual corporation’s financial liquidity and the political interests 
within the immediate environment. The findings indicated that the financial pressure of 
the recovering oil and gas prices had hampered the corporations’ willpower to engage in 
self-regulation and only limited their behavior in policy areas relevant to the profitability 
of their operations and addressed by political stakeholders. The findings also confirmed 
the research’s second hypothesis that the examined downstream petroleum corporations 
will self-regulate with strong focus on the energy transition and environmental 
protection. The executing corporation Nord Stream 2 AG focused on specific issues 
concerning the environment and workplace safety in its corporate self-regulation and 
published stakeholder engagement plans for the EU member states whose EEZ will be 
affected by the project. In comparison, the self-regulation observed in the investing 
corporations were more broadly formulated and extended to a wide array of issues, as, 
for example, diversity and anti-corruption measures. Still, their voluntary commitments 
focused extensively on issues concerning the environment and the energy transition as 
well. All of the investing corporations employed international frameworks to guide their 
non-mandatory reporting and attributed governance responsibility within their internal 
structure. However, appropriate quantitative measurements and sanctions concerning 
non-compliance with their voluntary commitments remained comparatively unclear. 
Although the findings indicated that the maturity of the corporation might play a part in 
the extent of addressed issues, the literature review had anticipated these difficulties in 
voluntary commitments. The academic literature had pointed out corporate social 
responsibility measures and reactionary commitments as the main forms of corporate self-
regulation, but the overall concern focused on the credibility issue of these commitments. 
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The commitments remain fragile with corporations having absolute authority over their 
own self-regulation governance and little incentive to improve their transparency. 
 
The subsequent discussion of the empirical findings centered on explaining the 
differences in form and content of the individual self-regulation commitments, the lack 
of monitoring in all examined corporations, and illustrating the value of green bonds for 
the self-regulation approach of the petroleum industry. The specific political environment 
of the executing corporation Nord Stream 2 AG incentivized the focus on highly specific 
environmental issues which were necessary for the permitting process of the gas pipeline 
project. In contrast, the investing corporations were more broadly affected by the 
changing stance on climate change and petroleum sourcing in the international 
community of states. The corporations have been under increased pressure to 
acknowledge and limit the polluting character of their operations and acknowledge their 
role in international frameworks such as the 2015 Paris Agreement. Hence, the investing 
corporations refer to international environmental frameworks and Nord Stream 2 AG 
predominantly to national regulation and trends. Regarding the lack of long-term 
monitoring and sanctioning, the research uncovered that most of the voluntary 
commitments remain in the realm of green-washing efforts without ensured long-term 
enforcement. Since the corporations avoid most of the reputational risk associated with 
irresponsible corporate behavior by the sole means of declaring their commitment to 
voluntary standards, the corporations lack clear financial incentives for engaging in long-
term self-regulation measures. 
 
The light at the end of the tunnel of this rather somber picture of corporate self-
regulation was an unanticipated finding within the self-regulation commitments of 
ENGIE: The investing corporation funds its environmental and energy transition projects 
through the issuance of green bonds to investors. Green bonds constitute an opportunity 
to address the much-discussed credibility problem of self-regulation in the petroleum 
industry by serving the economic and political needs of the corporations at the same time. 
The issuance of green bonds backed by the corporate balance sheet and embedded in the 
general corporate structure creates a win-win situation: The corporation is enabled and 
legally required within the green bonds market to slowly shift its business model to 
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meeting the new demands of the energy transition and the general society benefits from 
more extensive protection of their natural public goods, even in absence of government-
mandated regulation. The research concluded that the petroleum industry can potentially 
benefit from adopting green bonds as a means to credibly commit to their environmental 
standards and raise the necessary funding for its transition to a more environmentally 
friendly product portfolio. Based on acknowledging the self-interested nature of corporate 
self-regulation, ESG market opportunities provide the opportunity for international 
corporations both to react to the political interest within their immediate environment and 
to meet investor demands for profit-maximization. 
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8 Appendix 
 
 
 
 Appendix 1 - Nord Stream 2 AG (executing corporation) 
 
Own assessment 
Gas corporation with a single purpose and no intention to pursue further business outside the               
Nord Stream 2 pipelines; exclusive focus on communicating compliance and self-regulation           
in the policy areas of environment/sustainability and workplace safety, but little           
communication on monitoring or long-term metrics 
 
Basic information  1
Headquarters Zug, Switzerland 
Stock market not listed (wholly-owned subsidiary of Gazprom) 
Year of establishment 2015 
 
Main sources 
Mission statement  2
Permitting Overview  3
Permitting and Consultation (in local languages)  4
 
Standards 
Environment / Sustainability 
Nord Stream 2 is committed to meeting the highest environmental and social standards ; 5
A biodiversity conservation strategy for the Kurgalsky nature reserve in Russia, in line with              
international best practice, is put in place ; 6
Environmental Impact Assessment includes information on the project's implementation         
alternatives and their impacts and the corporation received a “Good Environmental Impact            
1 Bloomberg (2018). 
2 Nord Stream 2 (2018b). 
3 Nord Stream 2 (2018e). 
4 Nord Stream 2 (2018g)​. 
5 Nord Stream 2 (2018c). 
6 Nord Stream 2 (2018h). 
 Assessment” Award for the prepared EIA report in Finland - assessment required by national              7
legislation of affected EU member states ; 8
Best practice from Nord Stream 2 benchmarks for environmental protection 
 
Human rights / Labor rights 
n/a 
 
Finances / Taxation 
n/a 
 
Workplace safety 
Commitment to meet the highest international [HSE] safety standards during the construction            
and operation of [the] pipeline  9
 
Anti-corruption and anti-bribery 
n/a 
 
Diversity 
n/a 
 
Other standards 
Energy security - advancing and promoting the reliability and security of gas supply to the               
EU  10
 
Monitoring 
Best practice from Nord Stream pipeline project ; 11
Chief Commercial Officer with task to deal with permitting and legal affairs ; 12
7 Nord Stream 2 (2018d). 
8 Nord Stream 2 (2018b). 
9 ​Ibid. 
10 ​Ibid. 
11 ​Ibid. 
12 Nord Stream 2 (2018i). 
 Objective of Environmental Impact Assessment to develop plans for environmental          
management and monitoring  13
 
Willpower (economic environment)  14
Shareholder structure: 100% Gazprom; Fully-owned subsidiary of Russian energy         
corporation Gazprom with European energy corporations Uniper, OMV, Wintershall,         
ENGIE, and Shell funding sixty percent of the capital expenditure (fully privately funded             
investment of €9.5 billion in total); 
Each investing corporation will fund up to €950 million; proposed investment structure: 70             
percent bank loans, 30 percent private loans), leaving €4.75 billion of investment to Gazprom              
(Uniper: €285 million withdrawn by Nord Stream 2 AG as of December 31, 2017 ;              15
Wintershall: €324 million withdrawn ) 16
 
Motivation (political environment) 
Construction and operation in the exclusive economic zones of Denmark, Sweden, Finland,            
Russia, and Germany; international consultations with Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia           
under Espoo convention ; 17
Environmental Impact Assessments as a prerequisite for national permits (full set of permits             
received from Finland  and Germany ); 18 19
Law proposal L43 of the Danish parliament led to a change in Danish national law requiring                20
permission from the energy, security, and environment ministry to build “certain pipelines”            
(“visse rørledningsanlæg”) in the national territorial waters of Denmark ; 21
13 ​Nord Stream 2 (2018j). 
14 Nord Stream 2 (2017a). 
15 ​Uniper SE (2018a), p. 34. 
16 Wintershall (2018a), p. 10. 
17 ​Nord Stream 2 (2018e). 
18 Nord Stream 2 (2018k). 
19 Nord Stream 2 (2018a). 
20 ​Folketinget (2017). 
21 Energi-, Forsynings- og Klimaministeriet (2017). 
 Opposition from the U.S. and the Polish governments and EU Commission seeking to             22
influence decision-making ; Polish Office of Competition and Consumer Protection getting          23
involved in anti-monopoly proceedings on request from Polish government  24
 
 
Last update: 19 May 2018 
22 ​Reuters (2018b). 
23 ​European Commission (2017b). 
24 ​UOKiK (2018). 
 Appendix 2 - Uniper SE (investing corporation) 
 
Own assessment 
Young energy corporation focused on downstream activities of conventional energy          
generation and trade seeking to establish a corporate culture and reputation under financial             
pressure from hostile takeover attempt; self-regulation extensive and included in annual           
report; approach up to international standards with internal monitoring system and           
established from its year of establishment on 
 
Basic information 
Headquarters Düsseldorf, Germany  1
Stock market Frankfurt Stock Exchange  2
Year of establishment 2016 (spin-off of German electricity company E.ON)  3
 
Main sources of public information 
Annual report 2017  4
Sustainability report 2016  5
Code of conduct  6
 
  
1 ​Uniper SE (2017c).. 
2 ​Uniper SE (2018a), p. 16. 
3 ​E.ON SE (2016). 
4 ​Uniper SE (2018a), p. 14. 
5 ​Uniper SE (2017b). 
6 ​Uniper SE (2017e). 
 Standards 
“We act responsibly in everything we do.” ; Intention to apply for UN Global Compact              7
membership ; UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) as reference for each aspect           8
pursuant to Section 289c and 315c of the German Commercial Code  9
 
 
 
Environment / Sustainability 
SDG: goals 7,9, and 13 - climate change as main focus; 
Sustainability goals according to German CSR Directive Implementation Act and German           
Commercial Code (paragraph 289b section 3 and 315b section 3) ; 10
ISO certified environmental management systems in 88% of industrial facilities ; 11
7 ​Uniper SE (2017f). 
8 ​Uniper SE (2018b). 
9 ​Uniper SE (2018a), p. 100. 
10 ​Uniper SE (2018a), p. 97-109. 
11 ​Uniper SE (2018a), p. 101-102. 
 Environment and climate change as main topics in sustainability report : commitment to            12
energy transition and expansion of renewable energy sourcing (14); metrics communicated,           
but only broad strategy for future engagement with topics (22-26); 
Corporate CO2 footprint detering institutional investment but hasty coal exist not viable;            
stricter climate-protection policies in main markets (Germany, France, Netherlands, UK)          
regarded as high financial and reputational risk;  13
Reputational risk associated with climate change policies; no intention to invest in any new              
coal-fired power plants, but phasing out of coal investments stopped in the Netherlands             
because the potential phase-out is too unclear - clear policies and government direction             
needed  14
 
Human rights / Labor rights 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights as generally guiding document ; 15
More general awareness with focus on modern slavery, unlawful forced displacements, and            
forced and child labor in sourcing and trading of coal and gas  16
 
Finances / Taxation 
Taxation strategy only published for the UK where transparency regarding this issue is             
legally required; tax planning complies with the national law  17
 
Workplace safety 
Employee-related risks: uncertainty due to restructuring process, aging workforce, more          
extensive safety regulation in plants to be implemented ; 18
International Health and Safety management standards and systems and safety measured in            
Total Recordable Incidents Frequency  19
 
Anti-corruption / Anti-bribery 
12 ​Uniper SE (2017d). 
13 Uniper SE (2018a), p. 97. 
14 ​Uniper SE (2018a), p. 102-103​. 
15 Uniper SE (2017e), p. 36-37. 
16 Uniper SE (2018a), p. 98-99. 
17 Uniper SE (2017g). 
18 ​Uniper SE (2018a), p. 98. 
19 ​Uniper SE (2018a), p. 105. 
 SDG: goals 8 and 16 (business integrity); 
Corruption and bribery associated with serious reputational, legal and financial risks and            
compliance with all national legal and regulatory requirements is required at all times ; 20
New Code of Conduct with more detailed examples of corruption and bribery to address the               
issues since it came up as a risk area in the group-wide compliance risk assessment in 2016 ;                 21
specific attention being paid to intermediaries and bribes  22
 
Diversity 
SDG: goals 5 and 8 (diversity, health and safety); 
German Law for the Equal Participation of Women and Men in Leadership Positions in the               
Private Sector and the Public Sector demanding at least 30 percent women and 30 percent               
men in the supervisory board; 
Signed Corporate Diversity Charter Germany in 2016 ; 23
Diversity improvement plan and employee survey in place  24
 
Other standards 
Development of communities (donations, sponsorships, taxes)  25
Secure and reliable energy supply as contribution to society ; SDG: goals 7, 9, and 12               26
interpreted towards energy security 
 
Monitoring 
Currently, Chief Operating Officer assumes the role of Chief Sustainability Officer (3) ;            27
Management Board responsible for implementation of sustainability goals; appointment of          
one member as Chief Sustainability Officer reporting to the Supervisory Board; annual            
materiality analysis of carbon footprint and impact assessment ; 28
Sustainability information checked externally by pwc  29
20 ​Uniper SE (2018a), p. 99​. 
21 Uniper SE (2018a), p. 109. 
22 Uniper SE (2017e), p. 20. 
23 Charta der Vielfalt e.V. (2018). 
24 ​Uniper SE (2018a), p. 75-78. 
25 Uniper SE (2017e), p. 40-41. 
26 Uniper SE (2018a), p. 106. 
27 Uniper SE (2017d). 
28 Uniper SE (2018a), p. 99. 
29 pwc (2017). 
  
German Corporate Governance Code (voluntary long-term commitment) ; implementation        30
of protected whistleblowing system to third parties in accordance with code since November             
2017; GRI Framework was used to prepare the non-financial reporting (GRI Standard 103             
and guidance set for the Standards 103-1 and 103-2); aligned with the Enterprise Risk              
Management and published in Risks & Chances Report of the Combined Management Report             
on a quarterly basis (p. 97)  31
 
Development of ESG and country checks related to human rights risk in progress (based on               
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and OECD Due Diligence Guidance             
for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas  32
 
Willpower (economic environment)  33
 Revenue Profit 
2017 €72,238 million -€538 million 
2016 €67,285 million -€3,234 million 
 
Shareholder structure: 52.88% free float, 47.12% Fortum (hostile takeover attempt) 
 
Hostile takeover bid resulted in the transferral of 47.12 percent of shares from E.ON and               
other shareholders to Finnish competitor Fortum  34
 
Uniper’s Management Board and Supervisory Board recommended shareholders to not sell           
their shares to Fortum in November 2017 and promised dividend increases by an average of               35
25% per year through 2020 compared to the base year 2016 (-€0.55 per share)  36
 
30 Regierungskommission Deutscher Corporate Governance Kodex (2018). 
31 ​Uniper SE (2018a), p. 96. 
32 Uniper SE (2018a), p. 108. 
33 Uniper SE (2018a), p. 2. 
34 Uniper SE (2017h). 
35 Uniper SE (2017i). 
36 Uniper SE (2018a), p. 3. 
 Motivation (political environment) 
Core markets in Germany, Sweden, UK, Benelux countries, France, and Russia with a trading              
business in North America ; 37
Strong focus on decarbonization and stricter climate protection regulations in European core            
markets ; regulatory risks/chances considered moderate (impact €20-100 million) to low          38
(€5.1-20 million)  39
 
Default risk for receivables from Nord Stream 2, “particularly in the event the project is               
terminated”, perceived as lower than comparable corporate assets; extensive monitoring          
regarding U.S. Sanction Act on Russian energy export pipelines in place  40
 
 
Last update: 17 May 2018 
 
 
37 ​Uniper SE (2017c). 
38 Uniper SE (2018a), p. 14. 
39 Uniper SE (2018a), p. 56-63. 
40 Uniper SE (2018a), p. 59. 
 Appendix 3 - OMV (investing corporation) 
 
Own assessment 
Established integrated energy corporation with stable institutional investors extending its          
activities in Russia and the Middle East; self-regulation extensive, up to international            
standards, and well-defined objectives and monitoring with extensive involvement in external           
sustainability groups to protect operating license and gain social recognition 
 
Basic information 
Headquarters Vienna, Austria  1
Stock market Vienna Stock Market  2
Year of establishment 1956  3
 
Main sources of public information 
Group presentation  4
Annual report 2017  5
Sustainability report 2017  6
Code of conduct  7
  
1 OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017c). 
2 Wiener Börse (2018). 
3 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017c), p.17. 
4 Ibid. 
5 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2018b). 
6 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017a). 
7 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2018c). 
 Standards 
Comprehensive materiality analysis and process “to define measurable external         
commitments” according to GRI standards and Austrian law; five focus areas: (1) Health,             
Safety, Security, and Environment, (2) Carbon Efficiency, (3) Innovation, (4) Employees, (5)            
Business Principles and Social Responsibility ; 8
Guided by UN Sustainable Development Goals ; 9
Incentives: “maintain [the company’s] license to operate and secure the social acceptance of             
[the company’s] operations” ; 10
Responsible business behavior to “(1) gain access to new resources, (2) create a win-win              
situation for society, the environment and the Company, (3) secure social acceptance of the              
business operations, (4) attract best employees, contractors, and investors” 
 
Environment / Sustainability 
Climate change as one of the most important challenges with Paris Agreement 2015 and part               
of carbon strategy endorsing “Zero routine flaring by 2030” initiative ; 11
Reducing carbon and water intensity of operations portfolio; 
Extensive environmental management ; 12
Individual biodiversity-related projects in New Zealand, Norway, and Romania  13
 
Human rights / Labor rights 
Approach guided by UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and UN Global              
Compact and revised in 2017 in accordance with external stakeholders and UK Modern             14
Slavery Act 2015 ; 15
Strongly opposed to forced labor, slavery, child labor and human trafficking  16
 
Finances / Taxation 
8 OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2018c), p. 56-57. 
9 OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017c), p. 10. 
10 ​Ibid., p. 3. 
11 Ibid., p. 7. 
12 ​Ibid., p. 23-29. 
13 OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2018d), p. 27. 
14 OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017a), p. 19. 
15 OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2018d), p. 47. 
16 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017a), p. 20. 
 Preparation of financial statements according to International Financial Reporting Standards          17
(mandatory in certain state  18
 
Workplace safety 
Internal corporate regulation to identify hazards and prevent accidents and emergency and            
crisis management system according to ISO certification ; two death cases led to an             19
increased focus on safety in 2017  20
 
Anti-corruption / Anti-bribery 
Zero tolerance policy towards bribery, fraud, theft, and other forms of corruption ; reference             21
to OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and UK Bribery Act  22
 
Diversity 
Focus on gender and internationality; 97.8% of employees are being paid minimum wages             
fixed by law or agreed upon in collective bargaining agreements; 30% women in Senior Vice               
President positions by 2020 (2016: 23%)  23
 
Other standards 
OMV focuses on natural gas, the fossil fuel with the lowest carbon intensity as well as on                 
new energy sources and technologies (innovation contributing to society) ; 24
Stakeholder engagement details issued  25
 
High level of involvement in Environmental, Social and Governance agencies (e.g.           
FTSE4Good Global Index Series, Euronext-Vigeo Eurozone 120 index, and the Ethibel           
Sustainability Index Excellence Europe; partly external assessment of supply chain  26
 
17 OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017a), p. 28. 
18 Deloitte (2018). 
19 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017a), p. 15. 
20 ​Ibid., p. 3. 
21 Ibid., p. 28. 
22 ​Ibid., p. 44. 
23 ​Ibid., p. 31. 
24 Ibid., p. 17. 
25 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2018d), p. 52. 
26 ​Ibid., p. 14. 
 Monitoring 
The Chief Compliance Officer directly reports to the Executive Board and to the Supervisory              
Board ; ultimate accountability for the sustainability strategy and targets lies with the            27
Executive Board.  28
Assurance statement by external review organization ERNST & YOUNG  29
Committed to Austrian Code of corporate governance issues by Austrian Working Group for             
Corporate Governance (evaluated by independent advisors) ; 30
 
Annual sustainability report since 2009; prepared in accordance with the GRI G4 Oil and Gas               
sector supplements ​and IPIECA oil and gas industry guidance on voluntary sustainability            31
reporting ; 32
Prioritization of material issues based on internal “power interest matrix”; used to be easy to               
compare project progress by status ‘achieved’, ‘ongoing’, and ‘not achieved’ in sustainability            
report 2016, but dropped from sustainability report 2017 ; 33
Included in various ESG indexes, such as FTSE4Good and Euronext Vigeo index - Eurozone              
120 ; reporting to CDP Climate Change to ensure transparency of carbon efficiency efforts  34 35
 
  
27 OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017a), p. 28. 
28 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2018d), p. 12. 
29 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017a), p. 57. 
30 Ibid., p. 27. 
31 Global Reporting Initiative (2013). 
32 OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017a), p. 1. 
33 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2018d), p. 15. 
34 ​Ibid., p. 14. 
35 Ibid., p. 30. 
 Willpower (economic environment)  36
 Revenue Profit 
2017 €20,222 million €19,260 million 
2016 €853 million* €183 million 
*lower depreciation amortization and lower exploration expenses 
 
Shareholders structure: 43.3% free float, 31.5% ÖBIB (Austrian State and Industrial Holding            
Ltd), 24.9% IPIC (International Petroleum Investment Company), 0.2% other investors ;          37
relatively stable investor structure with IPIC and ÖBIB agreement for coordinated action and             
restricted transfer of shares  38
 
Adjusted strategy to manage the consequences of the lower oil price which translated into              
strong positive cash flow ; Investment in Nord Stream 2 pipelines as keystone in             39
downstream gas strategy  40
 
Motivation (political environment) 
Downstream gas activities focused on central Europe (Austria, Germany, Hungary, the           
Netherlands), Croatia, and Turkey; long-term plans to expand into Russia and the Middle             
East; Nord Stream 2 as linkage  41
 
Uncertain elections in France and the Netherlands turned out in favor of corporate strategy;              
tax reforms in Austria and economic upswing in Germany led to a favorable economic              
environment  42
 
 
Last update: 19 May 2018 
36 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017c). 
37 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2018b), p. 46. 
38 ​Ibid., p. 47. 
39 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2017a), p. 4. 
40 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2018b), p. 51. 
41 O​MV Aktiengesellschaft (2017c). 
42 ​OMV Aktiengesellschaft (2018b), p. 63. 
 Appendix 4 - Wintershall (investing corporation) 
 
Own assessment 
Established energy corporation under complete control of parent company BASF with the            
strong intention to grow and trade shares publicly in the medium to long-term after proposed               
merger with DEA; self-regulation commitments comparatively broad and with little own           
established objectives aside from the BASF Code of Conduct and environmental and safety             
issues 
 
Basic information  1
Headquarters Kassel, Germany 
Stock market not listed (wholly-owned subsidiary of BASF) 
Year of establishment 1894 (BASF since 1969) 
 
Main sources of public information 
Press releases 
Corporate Responsibility Report  2
BASF Code of Conduct  3
 
Standards 
“Economic considerations do not take priority over safety, health and environmental           
protection” ; 4
Refers to OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, the ILO’s core labor standards, the             
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the UN Global Compact, and the World Bank “Zero              
Routine Flaring by 2030” Initiative as binding reference framework ; 5
1 Wintershall (2018b). 
2 Wintershall (2017c). 
3 BASF (2017). 
4 ​Ibid. 
5 ​Wintershall (2017c), p. 24. 
 Wintershall is included in the BASF Group’s risk management system and use the             
corporation’s integrated sustainability approach for the Exploration & Production         
management system , 6
BASF defines globally applicable standards of conduct which also apply at subsidiary            
Wintershall; legal violations “can seriously harm [the] company’s reputation and inflict           
considerable damage, including financial damage”; anonymous compliance hotlines available        
 7
 
Environment / Sustainability 
Contribution to Paris Agreement of 2015 requirements through products ; Eco-efficiency          8
analysis established by BASF in 1996 and employed in Nord Stream 1 project ; 9
active partnerships to share knowledge about extensions of oil field lifetime and            
environmental protection (enhanced oil recovery) , focus on improvement of energy          10
efficiency in sourcing process and use of water and heating resources ; ISO certification of              11
environmental and energy management and reduction of CO2 exhaustion ; 12
Biodiversity risk assessment worldwide and individual projects in Germany and Norway  13
 
Human rights / Labor rights 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises           
and the International Labor Organisation (ILO) Tripartite Declaration of Principles          
Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy; especially focused on the abolition           
of child and forced labor, the principle of non-discrimination, fair compensation, and            
entitlement to adequate working hours and paid leave  14
 
Finances / Taxation 
n/a 
6 ​Ibid., p. 29. 
7 ​BASF (2017). 
8 Wintershall (2017c), p. 14-21. 
9 ​Ibid., p. 21. 
10 Ibid., p. 23-24.  
11 ​Ibid., p. 35. 
12 ​Ibid., p. 34. 
13 ​Ibid., p. 38. 
14 ​BASF (2017). 
  
Workplace safety 
Extensive internal H&S standards and fully harmonized and standardized across all sites;            
further development of management strategy ; introduction of HSE questionnaire for          15
managers to raise awareness  16
 
Anti-corruption / Anti-bribery 
BASF is strictly committed to fighting any kind of corruption and prohibits its employees,              
agents, and other third parties acting on BASF’s behalf from engaging in any form of bribery;                
“facilitation” or “grease” payments are not allowed.  17
 
Diversity 
BASF self-defined goals of 22-24 percent of women in management positions (2016: 19             
percent)  18
 
Other standards 
Natural gas as prime energy source to fight climate change :“We create value for the              19
company’s long-term development and the society. We provide sustainable solutions.” ; 20
Various social engagements, such as Young Vision Award, traditional Christmas donation,           
Stavanger Symphony Orchestra, global “Take it to heart” health campaign, etc.  21
 
Monitoring 
Chief Compliance Officer managing implementation of BASF Compliance Management         
System and reporting to Chairman of the Board of Executive Directors; Strategic Division             22
develops, implements and coordinates compliance standards together with community of          
experts; BASF compliance team at hand ; 23
15 ​Wintershall (2017c), p. 44-45. 
16 ​Ibid., p. 49. 
17 ​BASF (2017). 
18 ​Wintershall (2017c), p. 32. 
19 ​Ibid., p. 42-43. 
20 ​Ibid., p. 19. 
21 ​Ibid., p. 56-59. 
22 ​BASF (2017). 
23 ​Wintershall (2017c), p. 25-27. 
 Publication of sustainability report since 2007, renamed as corporate responsibility report in            
2015, no indication of self-regulation commitments in the annual report statement  24
 
Willpower (Economic environment) ,  25 26
 Revenue Profit 
2017 €3,244 million €2,768 million 
2016 €719 million €362 million 
2015 €12,998 million* €1,072 million* 
*activities divested to Gazprom in 2016 contributed 10.1 billion euros in sales and 260 million euros in EBIT                  
before special items  27
 
Shareholder structure: 100% BASF 
 
Investment of approximately €3.5 billion in low-production-cost fields and strengthening          
partnerships abroad by 2022 ; focus on natural gas production in Yuzhno Russkoye natural             28
gas field which will likely be transported through Nord Stream 2 pipelines to be sold in the                 29
European Union 
 
BASF intends to merge Wintershall with LetterOne’s DEA, retaining 67% of shares initially             
and listing the company on the stock exchange in the medium term   30
 
Motivation (political environment) 
Main market in Europe (Germany, UK, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway) and            
established/expanding into Libya, Argentina, Russia, and UAE  31
 
24 Wintershall (2018a). 
25 Ibid. 
26 ​Wintershall (2018c). 
27 Wintershall (2017d). 
28 ​Ibid. 
29 Wintershall (2018a). 
30 ​Wintershall (2017e) 
31 Wintershall (2018d). 
  
Last update: 19 May 2018 
 Appendix 5 - ENGIE (investing corporation) 
 
Own assessment 
Financially-solid energy corporation with international operations set on contributing to and           
meeting the demands of the energy transition; self-regulation extensively focused on           
environment and sustainability in the energy transition; issuance of green bonds as            
extraordinary self-regulation feature to raise funds for sustainability targets 
 
Basic information 
Headquarters La Défense, France  1
Stock market NYSE Euronext Paris  2
Year of establishment 1834 (GDF SUEZ renamed ENGIE in 2015)  3
 
Main sources of public information 
2017 Integrated Report  4
Code of Conduct ,  5 6
Corporate Social Responsibility Policy  7
 
Standards 
Objective: “to contribute to a more harmonious world and to secure [the corporation’s role as               
a leading stakeholder of the energy transition and associated services beyond energy” ;            8
reference to UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) throughout its sustainable policies          9
Internal brochure “Rely on CSR to gain customers and markets” to show how “CSR can be                
both a differentiating factor as well as a factor for performance”  10
1 ​Paris La Defense (n/a). 
2 ​Euronext (2018). 
3 ENGIE (2015). 
4 ENGIE (2018). 
5 GDF Suez (2013). 
6 Likely not updated since publication in 2013 as the document still refers to the corporation as GDF Suez. 
7 ENGIE (2017d). 
8 ​Ibid. 
9 ​Ibid., p. 6. 
10 ​ENGIE (2018a), p. 11. 
  
Environment / Sustainability 
Focus on energy transition and stable supply: “ENGIE is committed to responsible growth of              
its businesses (power, natural gas and energy services) in response to the central challenges              
of the energy transition towards a low-carbon economy: providing access to sustainably            
generated energy, combating climate change, reducing its effect and making responsible use            
of natural resources ; 11
Referral to COP22 Marrakech for implementation of the Paris Agreement 2015 ; 12
Specific targets: share of renewable energy in 2020 at 25% (SDG goal 7) and reduction in                
ratio of CO2 emissions by 20% (SDG goal 13)  13
 
Focus on environment and sustainability as market opportunity ; 14
Development and dedication to Green Bonds Market to finance energy transition projects,            
mainly wind, solar and hydroelectricity ; 15
“As a promoter of green finance, the Group is committed to financing its sustainable              
investments with green bonds, thus demonstrating the responsible nature of these projects and             
their positive impact on environment.”  16
 
Human rights / Labor rights 
Protection of human rights according to UN Global Compact, the French section of             
Transparency International, and the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative        
(involvement of external stakeholders)  17
 
Finances / Taxation 
n/a 
 
Workplace safety 
11 ENGIE (2018c). 
12 ENGIE (2018b), p.6. 
13 ENGIE (2017a), p. 6. 
14 ENGIE (2018b), p. 8-16 + 29. 
15 Ibid. 
16 ENGIE (2017a), p. 4. 
17 Ibid., p. 46. 
 Pledge to eliminate fatal and the most serious accidents and to provide everyone with a high                
degree of health, safety and security ; target to reduce internal occupational accident            18
frequency rate  19
 
Anti-corruption / Anti-bribery 
Reputational risk linked to ethical and responsible behavior ; human rights and corruption            20
risks considered for all investment projects; ISO 37001 Anti-Bribery Management Systems  21
 
Diversity 
Internal commitment to employ 25% women by 2020 (21.9% in 2016)  22
 
Other standards 
Public best practice for lobbying ; Whistleblowing hotline in place ; 23 24
Promotion of universal access to energy  25
 
Monitoring 
Responsibility for sustainability monitoring lies with Board of Directors with one Director            
representing the French state, Ethics and Compliance Department reporting to the General            
Secretariat under the supervision of the CEO (more than 250 ethics officers and             
representatives) ; special Green Bond Committee for approving projects that may be           26
financed by green bonds issued by the Group ; 27
Information generated according to GRI Reporting Standards from annual compliance          
procedure with fifteen indicators, internal and external audits, internal alert system, annual            
18 Ibid., p. 5. 
19 Ibid., p.6. 
20 ​ENGIE (2018d), p. 39. 
21 ENGIE (2017a), p. 7. 
22 ENGIE (2018d), p. 25-27. 
23 ENGIE (2017e). 
24 Engie (2018d). 
25 ENGIE (2017a), p. 5. 
26 ​ENGIE (2018d), p. 40-42. 
27 ENGIE (2017a). 
 assessment ; external rating to facilitate interactive dialog between company and          28
stakeholders (such as socially responsible investors (SRI))  29
 
Willpower (economic environment)  30
 Revenue Profit 
2017 €65,029 million €2,238 million* 
2016 €64,840 million €163 million 
*lower impairment losses, disposal of thermal merchant power plant assets, reduction in the cost of debt  31
 
Shareholder structure: 67.6% free float, 24.10% French state, 2.69% employee shareholders,           
5.61% other investors  32
 
“Good financial health of the Group is a gauge of the sustainability of its commitments to the                 
energy transition towards low-carbon generation activities” (p. 28) int 
 
Political environment (​motivation​) 
Activities worldwide, with focus on Europe (France, Benelux states, UK), Asia, and North             
America ; major capital expenditure in Latin America, France, and European infrastructure  33 34
 
Regulatory risk mainly seen in European CO2 market and country-specific risks  35
 
 
Last update: 18 May 2018 
 
28 Ibid., p. 47. 
29 ENGIE (2018e). 
30 ENGIE (2018f), p. 28. 
31 Ibid., p. 7. 
32 ENGIE (2017f). 
33 Engie (2016). 
34 ENGIE (2018f). 
35 ENGIE (2018a), p. 37. 
 Appendix 6 - Royal Dutch Shell (investing corporation) 
 
Own assessment 
One of the largest and most established petroleum corporations in the world with currently              
recovering revenue and profit streams from slumping oil prices in 2015 and 2016;             
self-regulative behavior focused on energy transition and transparency, but heavily hampered           
by non-compliance and lack of credibility (especially Nigeria)  1
 
Basic information 
Headquarters The Hague, the Netherlands and London, UK  2
Stock market London Stock Exchange   3
Year of establishment 1907  4
 
Main sources of public information 
Sustainability Report 2017  5
Shell Energy Transition Report  6
Shell General Business Principles  7
 
Standards 
“Our reputation will be upheld if we act in accordance with the law and the Business                
Principles” ; “Anything less than 100% compliance undermines our performance and risks           8
high costs that would hurt our bottom line as well as our hard-earned reputation” : 9
 
1 ​The Guardian (2015). 
2 Shell Global (2018b). 
3 London Stock Exchange (2018). 
4 ​Shell Global (2018b). 
5 ​Shell (2018a). 
6 ​Shell (2017c). 
7 Shell International Limited (2014). 
8 ​Shell (2018a), p.1. 
9 ​Shell International Limited (2015). 
 UN Sustainable Development Goals guiding self-regulative standards at Shell         
(access to energy, protection of human rights, support of biofuels, and action against climate              
change)  10
 
 
Topic selection map for Shell’s sustainability commitments  11
 
Environment / Sustainability 
Business strategy to meet change in market demand with a changed portfolio: “ambition to              
reduce the Net Carbon Footprint of [the company’s] energy products by around half by the               
middle of the century” ; World Bank Initiative “Zero Routine Flaring by 2030” ;            12 13
biodiversity projects  in its geographical areas of activity, e.g. bird survey in Oman  14
Natural gas and energy-efficient products at the center of providing cleaner energy  15
 
Human rights / Labor rights 
Reference to Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ILO conventions, UN Guiding           
Principles on Business and Human Rights, collaboration with the Danish Institute for Human             
10 Shell (2018a), p. 36-38. 
11 ​Shell (2018a), p. 5. 
12 Shell (2017c), p.5. 
13 World Bank (2015). 
14 Shell (2018a), p. 48 and 51-52. 
15 Ibid., p. 20 and 26. 
 Rights to improve corporate human rights approach (focus areas communities, labour           
rights, security, and supply chains)  16
 
Finances / Taxation 
Shell “compl[ies] with applicable tax laws wherever we operate” ; 17
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and taxation guidelines “A New Bar for            18
Responsible Tax” by the not-for-profit The B Team which are focused on transparency  19
 
Workplace safety 
‘Goal Zero’ to have no harm or leaks across operations at any given time; focused on                
personal, process, and transport high-risk activities and raising industry safety standards with,            
e.g. the American Petroleum Institute  20
 
Anti-corruption / Anti-bribery 
Current litigation into allegations of bribery and corruption in Shell’s investment in Nigerian             
oil block OPL 254 at the center of compliance issues, but standard to be in accordance with                 
UN Global Compact and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises  21
 
Diversity 
Primary focus to fill senior roles with people from the respective countries and develop              
women to assume senior roles; recently extended to LGBT ; little data except for increase of               22
women in senior leadership position from 7.2% in 2000 to 15.3% in 2010 
 
Other standards 
16 The Danish Institute for Human Rights (2018). 
17 Shell (2018a), p. 38. 
18 Shell (2018b). 
19 The B Team (n/a). 
20 Shell Global (n/a). 
21 Shell (2018a), p. 30. 
22 Shell International BV (2016). 
 Shell Foundation to coordinate efforts in social projects, such as supporting social            
entrepreneurs in low-income communities ($111 million was spent on voluntary social           23
investment worldwide) ; 24
Shell Global Helpline to raise ethics and compliance concerns  25
 
Monitoring 
Responsibility lies with Board of Directors, Executive Board, Corporate and Social           
Responsibility committee and internal tracking via global metrics  26
 
Membership in various ESG indices , such as CDP , Dow Jones Sustainability Index (since             27 28
2016 following exclusion due to Shell operations in Nigeria), FTSE4Good Index, etc. 
 
Reporting in line with the Global Reporting Initiative G4 core guidelines IPIECA - oil and               
gas industry association for environmental and social issues; API - American Petroleum            
Institute; IOGP - International Association of Oil & Gas Producers ; 29
Support for United National Global Compact, but information subject to Report Review            
Panel of independent experts instead of assurance  30
 
Independent statement of Report Review Panel criticizes the sustainability report: particular           
comprehensive on energy transition (most material to its business), depth of the discussed             
issues could be improved, focus on successes rather than risks, metrics and processes not              
apparent, integration of SDGs needed, amd gender diversity and inclusion should be a             
material issue  31
 
Willpower (economic environment) ,  32 33
23 Shell (2018a), p. 43. 
24 Ibid., p. 4. 
25 Shell (2018c). 
26 Shell (2018a), p. 13-15. 
27 Shell Global (2018c), p. 9. 
28 CDP (2018). 
29 Shell Global (2018a). 
30 Shell (2018a), p. 6. 
31 Ibid., p. 8-9. 
32 Shell (2018d). 
33 * $/€ exchange rate (1 January 2018): 0.83243. 
  
 Revenue Profit 
2017 €254,040 million* 
($305,179 million) 
€11,184 million* 
($13,435 million) 
2016 €194,448 million 
($233,591 million) 
€3,977 million 
($4,777 million) 
*recovering numbers from exceptionally bad trading years in 2015 and 2016  34
 
Shareholder structure: 43% free float, 3% The Vanguard Group, investment groups, 54%            
other investment groups and investors  35
 
“Without profits and a strong financial foundation, it would not be possible to fulfil our               
responsibilities” - general business principles (p.4). 
 
Motivation (political environment) 
Major projects all over the world ; 36
Major reputational risks and high public scrutiny: Shell heavily involved in the pollution of              
the Ogoniland in southern Nigeria; even after adopting a new remediation management            
system in 2010, Shell’s operations do neither “meet the local regulatory requirements [n]or             
international best practices”. ; “I have little doubt that in the minds of the Shell executives               37
there is one law for Africa and another law for the rest of the world.” Martyn Day, lawyer at                   
Leigh Day & Co, representing Nigerian claimants in legal action against Shell  38
 
 
Last update: 19 May 2018 
34 Reuters (2017d). 
35 ​Surperformance (2018). 
36 Shell Global (2018d). 
37 UNEP (2011). 
38 Leigh Day (2012). 
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